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KEEPING IT REAL: REFORMING THE “UNTRIED
CONVICTION” IMPEACHMENT RULE
MONTRE´ D. CARODINE*
ABSTRACT
There is a growing call for a “New Legal Realism,” that,
among other things, takes a “bottom-up” approach to studying the
effects of rules of law on the people to whom they actually apply on a
day-to-day basis.  The New Legal Realism movement spans across
various fields and disciplines related to law.  The movement is par-
ticularly evident in the area of criminal law where there is an in-
creasing effort to ensure reliability and accuracy in the system’s
results.  The recent move of some states to require racial impact state-
ments for pending legislation as well as the advocacy and findings of
the innocence movement exemplify this effort.  Even more compelling
are the recent lawsuits filed by public defenders in several states, cit-
ing their inability to represent their clients in a constitutionally effec-
tive manner and demanding to have their caseloads reduced until
they can be adequately funded.  This Article aids in the effort to im-
prove our justice system’s reliability, taking a New Legal Realist ap-
proach to the area of evidence law as applied in the criminal setting.
I explore the interrelationship between plea bargaining and the
use of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants at trial, two
Copyright  2010 by Montre´ D. Carodine.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.  I would like to
thank Dean Kenneth Randall, my colleagues on the University of Alabama School of Law
faculty, and the Alabama Law School Foundation for their generous support of my re-
search.  I am also deeply indebted to my husband, Halven Carodine, Jr., for all of his
comments and support and for his insightful perspective.  I owe special thanks to Profes-
sors Peter Alexander, Dorothy Brown, Brandon Garrett, Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Joan
Shaughnessy, and Melissa Waters for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.  I am also grateful to Bob Elliott, Stephen McNeill, and Erika Walker-Cash for their
excellent research assistance.  This Article greatly benefited from my presentation at the
“New Legal Realism” Panel at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting
(2009), and I am especially grateful to Professors Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer for
inviting me to participate on the Panel and for their invaluable comments, as well as the
invaluable comments of Professor Stewart Macaulay, who formally commented on the Arti-
cle.  Additionally, this Article greatly benefited from presentations at the University of Vir-
ginia School of Law Faculty Workshop, the Emory Law School Critical Race Theory
Workshop, the Louisiana State University School of Law Faculty Workshop, and the 2007
Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference.  I would finally like to acknowledge the law
faculty at Washington and Lee University as well as the Frances Lewis Law Center of Wash-
ington and Lee University for their support during the early development of this Article
when I was a member of the law faculty at Washington and Lee.
501
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 2 28-MAY-10 13:44
502 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:501
of the most controversial practices in the criminal justice system.  The
prior conviction impeachment rule is a classic and deeply entrenched
evidentiary rule.  In this Article, I rename the Rule, dubbing it the
“untried conviction” impeachment rule, to reflect the reality of its
application.  Indeed, the reality—overlooked by evidence and crimi-
nal law scholars—is that prior convictions used in later proceedings
to “impeach” criminal defendants are most often untried convictions,
having resulted from the plea bargaining system.  I propose a funda-
mental shift in the application of Rule 609 to reflect this reality.
Plea bargaining has rightly come under much scrutiny of late and is
considered a prominent feature of our current system that processes
defendants in an assembly-line fashion.  I propose that, as long as
we continue to impeach defendants with their untried convictions,
Congress and state legislatures should act to exclude from Rule 609’s
applicability the use of untried convictions.  Alternatively, until
lawmakers act, courts, who are charged with protecting the funda-
mental rights of criminal defendants, must vigilantly scrutinize the
practice of impeaching criminal defendants with untried convictions,
thus utilizing Rule 609 as an additional check on plea bargaining
instead of as a rubber stamp.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article will take a New Legal Realist approach to evidence
law as applied in the criminal setting by addressing the very real oper-
ation of a classic and deeply entrenched rule—the prior conviction
impeachment rule.  There is a growing call for—indeed, a movement
toward—a New Legal Realism that, among other things, values a “bot-
tom-up” approach to studying the effects of rules of law on the people
to whom they actually apply “on the ground” on a day-to-day basis.1
1. See Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 335, 339–40 (noting that New Legal Realism takes a “bottom-up” approach to legal
scholarship by examining the impact of law on the lives of ordinary people); Edward Lee,
Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1460–65 (discussing the
New Legal Realist approach in copyright law and noting that many legal issues within the
field can be resolved from the “bottom up” by copyright users rather than formal legal
institutions); Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They
Used to Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 385–86 (explaining that New Legal Realism will focus on
the gap between formal law and the actual practices of the legal system and the public in
resolving disputes); Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal
Realist Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REV. 483, 484–85, 512–13 (2007) (examining the impact of
social science and language on legal education and looking to empirical research to deter-
mine the best methods for studying law “on the ground”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2008) (explaining that New
Legal Realism focuses on closely examining reported cases in order to understand how
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The New Legal Realism movement spans across various fields and dis-
ciplines related to law.2  The movement is particularly evident in the
area of criminal law where there is an increasing effort to ensure relia-
bility and accuracy in the system’s results.  The recent move of some
jurisdictions to require racial impact statements for proposed legisla-
tion,3 as well as the advocacy and findings of the innocence move-
ment, exemplifies this effort.4 And perhaps the most recent and
compelling move to overhaul our justice system has come from some
of the major players within the system itself—public defenders.  The
New York Times recently reported on our criminal justice system’s cur-
rent crisis, particularly with respect to indigent defense.5  In at least
seven states, public defenders’ offices, fed up with the plea bargaining
“assembly line” style of justice, are refusing to defend any new clients
or have filed lawsuits to limit their caseloads.6  Instead of the idealized
system that many would like to think we have, in which those charged
“judicial personality” influences legal outcomes); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Vari-
eties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 69–70 (2009) (discussing three variants of New Legal Realism and explaining that
one variant, the contextual approach, engages in a “bottom-up” form of empiricism); Eric
A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for
Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 853–56 (2008) (proposing a theoret-
ical framework for New Legal Realism, particularly as it relates to biases of judges and how
those biases influence judicial voting patterns and actual case outcomes); Daniel A. Farber,
Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 302–03 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)) (discussing how behavioral law and
economics may comprise one of the “pillars” of legal realism).
2. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 1460–65 (discussing New Legal Realism in the context R
of copyright law); Mertz, supra note 1, at 484–85 (examining legal realism in the context of R
legal education).
3. See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements: Changing Policies to Address Disparities, 23
CRIM. JUST. 16, 17–18 (2008) (describing recent racial impact executive orders and legisla-
tion adopted in Wisconsin, Iowa, Connecticut, and Minnesota).
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 237
(“[W]e are at the beginning of an exciting new period of American criminal justice, one
directly related to the acknowledgment that we convict innocent people.”); Margaret M.
Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2003) (“If
innocent people have been and continue to be incarcerated and even executed, upon
what claims of legitimacy does our criminal justice system rely?”).
5. Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2008, at A1.
6. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing as an example the situation
in Miami-Dade County, where a judge ruled that the public defenders’ office could refuse
to represent many defendants arrested on lesser felony charges in order to provide a better
defense for other clients facing felony charges).
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with a crime are innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, we have what has become known as the “McJustice” system.7
This Article will explore the interrelationship between plea bar-
gaining, which most often is doled out in McJustice fashion, and the
use of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants at trial.  Plea
bargaining and prior conviction impeachment are two of the most
controversial practices in the criminal justice system.8  Both practices
have been separately criticized by scholars.9  But scholars have not yet
given serious, in-depth consideration to how the prior conviction im-
peachment rule, found in Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and various state versions of the federal rule, both promotes and legit-
imizes plea bargaining, and conversely, to how plea bargaining dimin-
ishes the evidentiary value of prior convictions.
The desirability of plea bargaining in the criminal process has
been the subject of much debate,10 which will likely continue.  Cur-
7. See id. (describing how one public defender, who is currently handling 155 clients,
often does not have time to visit the crime scenes, do legal research, or even meet his
clients before handling their plea bargains).
8. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2008)
(“Much has been made of an ‘innocence problem’ in plea bargaining.”); Alan D. Horn-
stein, Between Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction,
42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) (“The issue [of impeachment by prior conviction] is perhaps
one of the most controversial in the law of evidence.”).
9. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of Impeaching the
Nontestifying Declarant, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 495, 498 (1995) (describing the prior conviction
impeachment rule as “one of the most potent, and potentially prejudicial, methods of im-
peachment”); Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bar-
gaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2028 (2006) (noting that the plea bargaining system is
“biased and coercive”).
10. See Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2003) [hereinafter Bibas, Moral Values] (describing plea bar-
gaining agreements as “flawed substitutes” for jury trials); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2467–68 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside] (explaining that structural influences, such as lawyer quality, and other
factors, such as lawyer self-interest and caseloads, often cause the plea bargaining process
to “skew the fair allocation of punishment”); Bowers, supra note 8, at 1119 (portraying plea R
bargaining as a “categorical good for many innocent defendants” because inaccurate guilty
pleas suggest errors during arrest, charge, and trial—not during plea bargaining); Russell
D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV.
1237, 1239–41 (2008) (describing the use of plea bargaining to convict innocent defend-
ants as an “epidemic” and proposing a fixed-discount system, which would induce innocent
defendants not to relinquish their right to trial, to aid in stemming this trend); Klein, supra
note 9, at 2028 (noting that the current plea bargaining system is “biased and coercive” R
because it does not permit defendants to obtain discovery prior to negotiating a plea, does
not provide impartial arbitration, and results in defendants waiving many constitutional
rights); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2548, 2548–50 (2004) (explaining that the terms of plea bargains are often decided
based on prosecutors’ preferences, voter preferences, and budget constraints, rather than
on the law itself).
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rently, over two million people in this country are incarcerated, ac-
counting for approximately one fourth of the world’s prison
population.11  Those critical of plea bargaining point to more than
ample evidence that, across the country, the system is nothing more
than an assembly line in which hundreds of thousands of poor and
mostly minority defendants are processed, criminalized, and incarcer-
ated.12  Others see the system as an efficient and necessary means by
which to deal with crime and keep an overburdened judiciary from
collapsing.13  While efficiency should be an important goal of our sys-
tem, it pales in comparison to the more crucial goal of ensuring that
innocent defendants are not convicted.  And it is difficult to have any
confidence that our system currently pursues this goal of vindicating
the innocent.
On the one hand, we have attorneys like Arthur J. Jones—one of
the public defenders taking what he sees as an ethical stand against
the McJustice system—who have found themselves on “a treadmill of
frustration.”14  Mr. Jones described one morning when he looked at a
computer printout listing 155 clients.15  He then went to court to han-
dle arraignments and plea bargains for twenty-three clients, most of
whom he had never met.16  Mr. Jones has lamented his inability to
represent his clients in the constitutionally required manner and has
said that he would like more time to investigate cases and more oppor-
tunity to go to trial, rather than accepting the law enforcement ver-
sion of events and, after only a brief discussion, helping his clients to
make a life-altering decision.17
On the other hand, we have prominent and influential jurists,
like Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, who seem wholly discon-
nected from the reality of plea bargaining in this country.  Justice
Scalia has commented that he does not think the system ever encour-
ages innocent people to plead guilty,18 while Judge Easterbrook has
said that plea bargaining is not the problem—if innocent people
plead guilty and forgo trial, it is simply because they “appear to be
11. Life After Prison Can Be Deadly, a Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at A29.
12. See, e.g., Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 10, at 2529–30 (noting disparities R
in plea bargaining based on demographics, including minority and socio-economic status).
13. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1043 (2000) (noting
that plea bargaining has succeeded as a technique in criminal law because it “protects the
reputation of the [criminal justice] system as a whole”).
14. Eckholm, supra note 5. R
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No.
01-595).
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guilty.”19  I am sure that Mr. Jones would beg to differ with both of
these assertions.
In this Article, I will begin with a critique of plea bargaining, and
will reveal that it is not the ideal process that Justice Scalia and Judge
Easterbrook claim it to be.  In Part I, I will set up the New Legal Real-
ist framework required to address the interrelationship between plea
bargaining and Rule 609.20  I will briefly discuss the development of
the criminal procedure reform movement as well as some of its com-
mon themes and goals.  Then I will discuss how this Article advances
the goals of New Legal Realism.
In Part II, I will discuss the policy to promote plea bargaining in
the rules of evidence.  I will demonstrate the express policy of promot-
ing this regime in the Federal Rules of Evidence by discussing Rule
410, which protects statements made during plea negotiations to en-
courage defendants to speak candidly to prosecutors.21  I then will dis-
cuss Rule 609 with respect to its general operation and with respect to
plea bargaining in particular.22  Rule 609, though it does not expressly
adopt the policy of promoting plea bargaining, effectively furthers
that policy.  Prosecutors perceive defendants’ prior records as
strengthening their cases and have much more bargaining power as a
result of Rule 609.  Moreover, courts equate untried convictions with
trial convictions, and thus eschew any notion that plea bargaining is
an inferior method for seeking the truth in criminal cases, as some
scholars have argued and as some studies have suggested.
In Part III, I initially will establish that the safeguards of the trial
process are central to Rule 609’s legitimacy.23  The Rule authorizes
the admissibility of judgments of conviction, which would ordinarily
be inadmissible hearsay.24  Rule 609 operates as an exception to the
rule against hearsay by justifying the admissibility of convictions from
other courts because of the purported reliability of the criminal pro-
cess that produces those convictions.25  The process ideally includes a
trial by jury applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.26  I will
examine in depth the plea bargaining process in the United States to
determine whether it is indeed a viable substitute for the trial process
19. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1970
(1992); see infra Part III.A.1.
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. See infra Part III.A.1.
25. See infra Part III.A.1.
26. See infra Part III.A.1.
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for Rule 609 purposes.27  I will consider the available data from vari-
ous reliable sources regarding the day-to-day “on the ground” reality
of plea bargaining.28  In my evaluation of the system’s credibility, I will
explore various aspects of the plea bargaining regime, including the
roles of the law, prosecutors, defense attorneys, indigent defense pro-
grams, and judges.29  These major components of the system work to-
gether to sustain and perpetuate a phenomenon in which plea
bargaining has virtually displaced the trial as the means of truth-seek-
ing.  The result is a system that, in many jurisdictions, is deeply flawed.
Instead of trials, which are quite rare, we now have an assembly-line
“processing” of defendants, the majority of whom are poor.  I will con-
clude in Part III that the fundamental problems with the plea bargain-
ing system render the system woefully unreliable as a source of Rule
609 evidence.30  Moreover, the use of evidence resulting from the cur-
rent plea bargaining regime is antithetical to the goals of the eviden-
tiary rules.
In Part IV, I will offer solutions for reform.  The most ideal solu-
tion would be to eliminate the use of prior convictions altogether for
impeachment purposes.  To the extent that Congress and state legisla-
tures continue to feel the need to hold fast to Rule 609’s tradition,
they should prohibit the use of prior untried convictions to impeach
criminal defendants.31  Until legislators take such action, courts
should allow criminal defendants to raise objections to the reliability
of their convictions obtained via the plea bargaining process.32  Once
the defendant makes a colorable claim of unreliability, the prosecu-
tion should carry the ultimate burden of persuasion that these convic-
tions are reliable enough to be admitted into evidence.33
In outlining the approach that judges should take in assessing the
reliability of untried convictions, I will draw from the same due pro-
cess fundamental fairness principles that courts currently use to deter-
mine the weight of judgments from foreign countries, both civil and
criminal.34  I will propose an analysis of untried convictions that is
analogous to the approach used in the foreign judgment context, but
that is also specifically tailored to the untried conviction impeachment
practice.  I then will address the argument that my proposal might
27. See infra Part III.A.2–3.
28. See infra Part III.A.2–3.
29. See infra Part III.A.2.
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Part IV.A.
32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. See infra Part IV.B.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 570–88. R
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lead to inefficiency by allowing challenges to Rule 609 evidence and
that my proposal might clog the system by decreasing the number of
plea bargains.35  My approach to assessing the reliability of proffered
evidence in the Rule 609 context is no different from other eviden-
tiary approaches in analogous areas, such as Daubert hearings for the
admissibility of expert testimony.  Moreover, my proposal will improve
the overall accuracy of the system, which is a more cost-effective strat-
egy in the long run than perpetuating assembly-line justice.  Any con-
cern about further burdening the system must be addressed by
properly funding the system, which a handful of jurisdictions are at-
tempting to do.
I. REAL CHANGE: A NEW LEGAL REALIST FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING
RULE 609
While there are differences in the approaches to New Legal Real-
ism, there are common basic tenets and themes.36  In this Article, I
focus on some of the common themes of New Legal Realism, while
also shaping a framework for New Legal Realism in the field of evi-
dence.  I will briefly outline my New Legal Realist approach to analyz-
ing Rule 609 in this Part.
A. Bottom-Up Analysis
In critiquing the use of untried convictions, I am concerned in
this Article with what actually happens on the ground on a day-to-day
basis in the criminal process.  For example, it is particularly important
to consider the day-to-day struggles faced by lawyers like Amy Weber, a
public defender in Miami, who maintains about fifty serious felony
cases at the same time.37  In a single day, Ms. Weber had thirteen cases
set for trial and had to seek delays for all but one case.38  That same
day, one of her clients was in jail on felony charges, and the prosecu-
tors offered him a plea deal of one year in prison.39  Ms. Weber admit-
ted that she had no time to discuss the plea deal with her client.40
When the prosecutors did not hear from her, they withdrew the one
year offer and her client later accepted a five year sentence.41  Ms.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 612–17. R
36. Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 339. R
37. Eckholm, supra note 5. R
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Weber lamented, “ ‘My client suffered and it makes me feel
terrible.’”42
A client of Ms. Weber’s colleague also suffered from the current
plea bargaining process.43  During what might be loosely referred to
as “negotiations,” prosecutors categorized her colleague’s client as a
“‘habitual offender’” because of his prior convictions and calculated
their offer based on that classification.44  The client was going to ac-
cept the offer, which was based on the prosecutors’ miscalculation of
the minimum sentence, because his overburdened attorney had no
time to check the prosecutors’ math.45  The prosecutors, fortunately,
caught their own mistake.46  One has to wonder how many mistakes
have not been caught or how many prosecutors have been unwilling
to admit such mistakes.  Indeed, the attorney noted rhetorically, “ ‘You
see how easily accidents can happen? . . .  He easily could have gotten
three years instead of one.’”47  These two examples illustrate that fo-
cusing on those at the bottom provides important information about
the effects of the system, whereas examination of those at the top only
would not necessarily show the same effects.48
An important tenet of New Legal Realism is the necessity of a
“bottom-up” approach to ascertain the real effects of legal rules “at
the ground level.”49  As Professor Stewart Macaulay remarked, “If we
are interested in the likely consequences of any rule, or system created
by law, or if we are interested in living social problems, we must add a
view of law in its full context.”50
This is not to say that there is not value in studying those at the
“top.”51  Indeed, in one of the varieties of New Legal Realism, scholars
study elite institutions, such as the judiciary52 and corporate law
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 339–41 (explaining the importance of “bottom- R
up” empirical research in New Legal Realist scholarship).
49. Id. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Macaulay, supra note 1, at 391 R
(noting that understanding the consequences of law requires analysis in all of its contexts).
50. Macaulay, supra note 1, at 391. R
51. Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 340 (internal quotation marks omitted) (observing R
that it is “important to continue research on the institutions and decision-makers at the
‘top’”).
52. See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 831, 833–34  (“We believe that much of R
the emerging empirical work on judicial behavior is best understood as a new generation
of legal realism.”); Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing
Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 740–43
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firms.53  Moreover, much of traditional legal scholarship has taken a
“top down” approach.54  So, a core value of the New Legal Realist
movement must be an unremitting commitment to remember those
at the bottom who are affected by the policies made by those at the
top.55
Indeed, there was much talk in the 2008 presidential campaign
about a “bottom up” approach to governing.56  President Barack
Obama’s campaign, which even his critics have admitted was ground-
breaking and innovative, was largely a grass-roots, on-the-ground
movement.57  Then-candidate Obama similarly remarked, “One of my
fundamental beliefs from my days as a community organizer is that
real change comes from the bottom up.”58
Just as future campaigns will surely be shaped by Obama’s re-
markable grass-roots success, legal scholarship can learn from his cam-
paign’s example.  To make legal rules effective, we must address how
they work on the ground and understand the people actually affected
by the rules.59  As Karl Llewellyn, the quintessential “old” legal realist,
recognized, “ ‘Law’ without effect approaches zero in its meaning.”60
Indeed, “[b]eyond rules . . .  lie effects: beyond decisions stand people
whom rules and decisions directly or indirectly touch.”61  Taking a
bottom-up approach to legal scholarship “requires us to be sensitive to
the realities of power arrangements and hierarchies in studying law.”62
(2008) (discussing the importance of transparency in sentencing data, specifically the iden-
tity of sentencing judges, to identify sources of judicial sentencing disparity that need refor-
mation); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical
Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004) (discussing the importance
of religion in judicial decisionmaking); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gen-
der and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761–62
(2005) (discussing the indirect effects of gender on judicial decisionmaking).
53. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, “If You Can’t Join ‘Em, Beat ‘Em!” The Rise and Fall of the
Black Corporate Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1733, 1737 (2008) (examining the issues faced by
large black corporate law firms); see also Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 350–56 (quoting a R
transcript of Professor David B. Wilkins, in which he discusses his “ ‘ground level’” research
on black lawyers in elite law firms at the Wisconsin Law Review’s 2005 New Legal Realism
Symposium).
54. See Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 340. R
55. Id.
56. See The Facebooker Who Friended Obama, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2008, at C1 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (discussing then-candidate Obama’s innovative, grass-roots ap-
proach to political campaigning).
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1222, 1248–49 (1931).
60. Id. at 1249.
61. Id. at 1222.
62. Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 340. R
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This means that we focus on the most vulnerable in our society—per-
sons who have no power and no voice.63  Considering perspectives of
marginalized groups furthers this goal.64
I have previously critiqued prior conviction impeachment from a
critical race perspective while incorporating empirical data into my
analysis.65  In my consideration of the race perspective in the applica-
tion of the classic prior conviction impeachment rule, I encountered a
serious process problem and theoretical incongruity that the Rule per-
petuates66 and which I address in this Article.  As I have argued, race
becomes character evidence under Rule 609 because of the mis-
characterization of blacks in the criminal justice system.67  However,
working alongside and in furtherance of racial injustice is the separate
but related problem of procedural injustice, which I address in this
Article.  With fewer cases going to trial, plea bargaining has replaced
the criminal trial process—a process that incarcerates a staggering
proportion of the African-American and Latino communities.68  In
Part III of this Article, for example, I discuss a study that analyzed
hundreds of thousands of felony cases and found that African-Ameri-
can defendants were much less likely than white defendants to receive
favorable plea deals that included in their terms, among other things,
the later expungement of the defendant’s record.69
Rather than simply evaluating Rule 609 in isolation, a New Legal
Realist approach would consider how the effect of the Rule and man-
ner in which it operates informs the theoretical analysis of it.70  Admit-
tedly, this approach will make some uneasy.  Failing to focus on this
segment of our society and the operation of our laws with respect to
those individuals leads to “institutionalized blindness.”71  But “includ-
63. Id. at 340–41.
64. Id.
65. See Montre´ D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the
Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521 (2009) (arguing that the prior impeach-
ment rule is unreliable hearsay because it gives evidentiary value to race through its reli-
ance on a criminal justice system that unjustifiably disadvantages blacks).
66. Id. at 555–58.
67. Id. at 528–37.
68. See Mauer, supra note 3, at 17 (discussing the racial disparity within the criminal R
justice system, specifically highlighting the high incarceration rate for African-American
and Hispanic males).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 383–86. R
70. See Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 339 (“A bottom-up approach takes an expansive R
and open-minded view of the impact of law, and also includes within its purview a wide
range of socio-economic classes and interests.”); Macaulay, supra note 1, at 391 (“If we are R
interested in the likely consequences of any rule, or system created by law, or if we are
interested in living social problems, we must add a view of law in its full context.”).
71. Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 341. R
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ing the ‘bottom’ of the social hierarchy in our analyses of law is not
always easy; the less powerful people in society are often more invisi-
ble and silenced.”72  Also, taking a bottom-up approach is not easy
because it requires challenging long-held assumptions—often the
most basic assumptions about our rules of law—which is exactly what
this Article does.73
B. Challenging Assumptions
The consideration of the effects of laws from the bottom-up re-
quires “an expansive and open-minded view of the impact of law.”74
We must be willing to break out of the formal categories that currently
restrain our analyses.75  When we rely and build upon “unexamined
assumptions,” we perpetuate the institutionalized blindness previously
mentioned.76  The assumptions are most often those held by influen-
tial actors at the top, and therefore the New Legal Realist approach
must also address the decisionmakers at top.77  This Article, in addi-
tion to focusing on the bottom, considers the perspectives of judges in
shaping the view of untried convictions, which contribute to the cur-
rent blind spot in legal scholarship and the system generally with re-
gard to the use of such convictions to impeach defendants under Rule
609.78
Justice Scalia, for example, has openly exposed institutional
blindness when it comes to plea bargaining.  During oral arguments
in United States v. Ruiz,79 he “reacted vehemently” to the notion that
the American plea bargaining regime coerces or even encourages in-
nocent defendants to plead guilty.80  Responding to defense counsel,
he stated the following:
No. I—I object to that. I—I don’t think our system ever en-
courages or, indeed, even permits an innocent person to
plead guilty.  Our rules require the judge to—to interrogate
the person pleading guilty to make sure that, indeed, the
person is guilty.  There is nothing in our system that encour-
72. Id. at 340–41.
73. See infra Part I.B.
74. Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 339. R
75. Id.
76. Id. at 340; see also supra text accompanying note 71. R
77. See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. R
78. See infra Part III.A.2.d.
79. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 26. R
80. Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 739, 797.
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ages or even allows an innocent person to—to plead guilty.
And I would be horrified if—if there were something like that.81
There is ample evidence, which I discuss extensively in this Arti-
cle, that directly contradicts Justice Scalia’s unrealistic view of the sys-
tem.82  Likewise, there is also ample evidence refuting Judge
Easterbrook’s argument, addressed more fully below,83 that plea bar-
gaining is actually superior to the trial process.84  There is, in fact,
hard data that challenges and refutes both of these jurists’
assumptions.85
The type of institutional blindness evidenced by Justice Scalia’s
comments and Judge Easterbrook’s analysis is perpetuated in the ap-
plication of Rule 609.86  If we look at readily available empirical data
on the criminal justice system generally and plea bargaining in partic-
ular, which a New Legal Realist would do (or would collect on her
own), the following question emerges: Why, as an evidentiary matter,
do we presume the reliability of prior convictions when there is availa-
ble data suggesting that the system has serious flaws and often pro-
duces unreliable results?87  Evidence law is concerned with, among
other things, the presentation of reliable information at trial.88
This Article argues, relying on available data, that there are
enough serious flaws in the system as a whole that we should not com-
pound the criminal justice system’s mistakes by using convictions as
evidence in subsequent cases, or we should at least view prior convic-
tions offered into evidence with much more skepticism.89
C. “Legal Optimism”90
My approach to critiquing and offering solutions for reform in
this Article incorporates the “core ‘trilectic,’” which lies “at the heart
of” New Legal Realism, in that it “combine[s] empirical research, le-
gal theory, and policy.”91  While the New Legal Realist approach will
81. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 26 (emphasis added). R
82. See infra Part III.A.3.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 230–37; see also infra Part III.A. R
84. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 1972 (“[P]lea bargaining [is] at least as effective as R
trial at separating the guilty from the innocent.  To the extent there is a difference, negoti-
ation between sophisticated persons unencumbered by the rules of evidence is superior.”).
85. See infra Part III.A.2–3.
86. See infra Part III.B.
87. See infra Part III.A.2.
88. See infra notes 216–27 and accompanying text. R
89. See infra Parts III–IV.
90. See Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 345 (proposing the “concept of ‘legal optimism’ R
as an integral feature of New Legal Realism”).
91. Id.
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undoubtedly be skeptical about the operation and effect of rules of
law, it “need not imply a nihilist surrender to pure critique.”92  The
New Legal Realist will search for means by which to operate within the
existing system to eliminate as much as possible the problems that her
skepticism helped to uncover.  Indeed, one group of New Legal Real-
ists has posited the following:
[N]ew legal realist research will certainly critically examine
the law’s failures, but it will not neglect examination of
spaces for positive social change in and around the law.  This
charts a path between idealism and skepticism, by both re-
maining cognizant of hierarchies of power and the para-
doxes they create for law, and also asking what can be done
to work toward justice within the existing structures.93
While I am skeptical of both plea bargaining as the dominant
process in the criminal system as well as Rule 609 convictions as a
means by which to assess character for truthfulness at trial, I under-
stand, realistically, that both are deeply entrenched aspects of the sys-
tem that are not likely to completely disappear from the legal
landscape anytime soon.  I do, however, believe that my critique can
both add to the existing critiques that separately address plea bargain-
ing and Rule 609,94 and also give concerned advocates and judges a
way to work within the existing framework in addressing the issues
that I raise.95  Indeed, by focusing on the reliability of prior convic-
tions as an evidentiary matter, I extract a core principle from the ex-
isting structure and foundation of the evidence rules, particularly as
applied in the criminal process.96  I believe that it is important that
the New Legal Realist expose to institutions their failure to adhere to
their own ideals and that she work within the existing system to urge
them to do so.
Having outlined my New Legal Realist agenda for this Article, I
turn specifically to Rule 609 and its interrelationship with the plea
bargaining process.
II. RULE 609: FURTHERING THE POLICY FAVORING PLEA BARGAINING
Rule 609 and plea bargaining are highly controversial aspects of
our criminal justice system.97  Both plea bargaining and Rule 609 are
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See infra Parts II–III.
95. See infra Part IV.
96. See infra Part III.A.
97. See infra Part II.B.
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mechanisms that, working together, help to perpetuate a vicious cycle
of criminalization, incarceration, recidivism, and re-incarceration.98
Plea bargaining mass-produces convictions;99 hence, my focus in this
Article is on untried convictions only as opposed to convictions gener-
ally.100  Indeed, untried convictions are a major source of Rule 609
evidence.  As I discuss later in this Article, the vast majority of convic-
tions are obtained through plea bargaining.101  These convictions can
be used as evidence in subsequent prosecutions under Rule 609(a).102
This weakens the defendant’s chances of acquittal, thus making subse-
quent plea bargains more likely.103
While the major goal of this Article is to demonstrate how plea
bargaining undermines Rule 609’s legitimacy, in this Part, I consider
another important aspect of the relationship between plea bargaining
and the prior conviction rule—the degree to which Rule 609 perpetu-
ates the policy of plea bargaining by actually facilitating plea deals
when a defendant already has a criminal record and realizes (often
having been reminded by the prosecutor or his own attorney) that
should she choose to go to trial and testify, a conviction will weigh
heavily against her.104  Indeed, there is, as a general matter, a decided
policy in both United States Supreme Court jurisprudence and the
evidentiary rules of promoting plea bargaining.105  Rule 609 furthers
that policy.
A. The Decided Policy of Promoting Plea Bargains
According to the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics, in the seventy-five “most populous counties” in the United
States, ninety-seven percent of felony convictions resulted from guilty
pleas in 2004.106  In federal court, which represents only five percent
of convictions in the country,107 over ninety-five percent of felony con-
98. See infra Part II.B.
99. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. R
100. See infra Part III.A.
101. See infra Part III.A.
102. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
103. See infra Part II.B.2.
104. See infra Part II.B.
105. See infra Part III.B.
106. TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2004 3 (2008), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf.
107. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIM-
INAL CASES 4 (2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
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victions resulted from guilty pleas in 2005.108  Other recent data gath-
ered by the Department of Justice indicate that over ninety-five
percent of state felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas.109
The Supreme Court has said that plea bargaining “is an essential
component of the administration of justice” and “[i]f every criminal
charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal
Government would need to multiply by many times the number of
judges and court facilities.”110  Touting the laudable attributes that
purportedly make plea bargaining “highly desirable,” the Court noted
that plea bargaining promotes efficiency by fostering a “prompt and
largely final disposition of most criminal cases.”111  Additionally, the
process is good for defendants because “it avoids much of the corro-
sive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for
those who are denied release pending trial.”112  Society benefits from
plea bargaining because “it protects the public from those accused
persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on
pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and dis-
position, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of
the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.”113
There is also an express policy in the Federal Rules of Evidence
that promotes and supports the current plea bargaining regime.114
Specifically, under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, evi-
dence of statements made by the defendant during plea negotiations
that ultimately, for whatever reason, fail to produce a guilty plea are
not admissible against the defendant in any subsequent criminal or
civil proceedings.115  It has been widely recognized that the purpose
108. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 245 tbl.D-4 (2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appen-
dices/d4.pdf (reporting 77,339 convictions, with 74,024 resulting from guilty pleas).
109. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEL-
ONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURT, 2002 1 (2004), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fssc02.pdf (“Guilty pleas accounted for 95% of felony convictions in State courts in
2002.”); see also Covey, supra note 10, at 1238 & n.2 (noting the Justice Department’s statis- R
tics and observing that “[u]pwards of 95% of all state and federal felony convictions are
obtained by guilty plea”).
110. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
111. Id. at 261.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee’s note (“Exclusion of offers to plead guilty
or nolo has as its purpose the promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compro-
mise. . . .  ‘Effective criminal law administration in many localities would hardly be possible
if a large proportion of the charges were not disposed of by such compromises.’” (citation
omitted)).
115. FED. R. EVID. 410.
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of Rule 410 is to promote the plea bargaining process, without which
the criminal justice system as it stands today would purportedly com-
pletely collapse.116
The Advisory Committee’s note following Rule 410 states that the
purpose of the Rule is “the promotion of disposition of criminal cases
by compromise.”117  The Committee further observes that “[e]ffective
criminal law administration in many localities would hardly be possi-
ble if a large proportion of the charges were not disposed of by such
compromises.”118  The theory underlying the Rule is that a defendant
would be discouraged from speaking freely with prosecutors if he
thought that his statements could be used against him should plea
negotiations break down and the case proceed to trial.119  The Rule
“protects” the defendant only to the extent that this protection is con-
sistent with the overarching goal of promoting the plea bargaining
regime.  In reality, the Rule, as it has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court, does not really protect defendants at all.120  It does, however,
nicely operate to protect the plea bargaining machine.  Prosecutors
can, and routinely do, include a waiver of the defendant’s rights
under Rule 410 within plea agreements.121
Rule 410 falls in the same category as some other specialized evi-
dentiary rules that exclude evidence as a matter of social policy, such
as the rule excluding the admissibility of liability insurance to prove
negligent or wrongful action.122  I will again turn my attention to Rule
116. See Blacklege v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (explaining that “the guilty plea and
the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country’s criminal
justice system”).
117. FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee’s note.
118. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
119. See Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1541, 1550 (1998) (discussing the arguments against Rule 410 waivers, specifically that
“‘candid and effective plea bargaining could be severely injured’” (quoting United States
v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d, 513 U.S. 196 (1995))).
120. See infra Part III.B.
121. See United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1396 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that plea
bargains “commonly contain a provision stating that proffer information that is disclosed
during the course of plea negotiations is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt, but
is admissible for purposes of impeachment”); Joseph S. Hall, Rule 11(e)(1)(C) and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines: Bargaining Outside the Heartland?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 587, 600–01 (2002)
(noting the trend toward including waivers of defendants’ rights under Rule 410 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the corresponding Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure); see also infra Part III.B.1.
122. See FED. R. EVID. 411 (prohibiting the admission of evidence of insurance on “the
issue of whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully”); see also Andrew E.
Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 171, 218 (1999) (noting
that “[s]ome evidence rules partly serve the purpose of promoting desired behavior
outside the courtroom”).
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410 later in Part III to demonstrate further how this Rule has been
manipulated in a manner that encourages coercive plea bargaining
tactics, thus undermining confidence in the system’s reliability.123  For
now, it is important to note simply that there is a decided policy in
favor of compromising criminal cases in the Federal Rules of Evidence
as written and as interpreted by the Supreme Court.  The larger ques-
tion with which I will grapple later is whether this is a desirable policy,
particularly in light of the realities of plea bargaining.124  Is this a sys-
tem that justifies the sacrifices to the truth-seeking function of the evi-
dentiary rules?125
B. How the Practical Operation of the Prior Conviction Impeachment
Rule Promotes Plea Bargaining
1. The General Operation of Rule 609 in Practice
Rule 609 is an exception to the general ban on character evi-
dence in the Federal Rules of Evidence.126  Under the federal version
of the Rule, which a majority of states have adopted in large part
(some states verbatim),127 a criminal defendant’s prior convictions
can be used against that defendant should she choose to take the
stand in her own defense, as long as the initial crime “required proof
or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement.”128  Thus, the
prosecution can claim that the defendant is not credible when she
tells the jury that she is not guilty of the current crime because she has
been convicted previously of a separate, unrelated crime in prior
court proceedings.129  It is important to note that under the Rule,
123. See infra Part III.B.1.
124. See infra Part III.B.
125. See infra Part III.B.
126. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404 (stipulating that character evidence is generally inad-
missible to prove action in conformity with that character).  I recognize that Rule 404(b)
provides for the admissibility of “[o]ther crimes, wrongs, or acts” under certain circum-
stances, such as to prove motive, opportunity, or absence of mistake or accident, but not to
prove propensity. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  Moreover, there are special rules that allow a
person’s prior sexual offenses or child molestation offenses to be admitted in cases involv-
ing allegations of sexual offenses or child molestation. See FED. R. EVID. 413–415 (provid-
ing the rules relevant to the admissibility of evidence of sexual assault and child
molestation offenses).  Rules 404(b) and 413 through 415 deserve separate treatment be-
cause of the very different manner in which they are treated in comparison to Rule 609
convictions.  Thus, it is beyond the scope of this Article to address these rules in detail.
127. For a survey of various state versions of Rule 609, see Carodine, supra note 65, at R
538–39 & nn.92–96.
128. FED. R. EVID. 609.
129. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 813 (1993) (explaining that Rule 609 is based on
an assumption that propensity to lie under oath can be inferred from a prior conviction).
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convictions need not be from the particular jurisdiction in which the
instant proceedings are pending.130  Thus, the federal rule would al-
low a federal prosecutor to impeach a defendant with her state convic-
tion, and the state rule would allow a state prosecutor to impeach a
defendant with her federal conviction.  For ease of reference, this Ar-
ticle will mainly refer to the federal rule.
Generally, the Rule applies to convictions that are punishable by
death or by imprisonment in excess of one year, which are usually
felonies.131  The operative word here, particularly for purposes of this
Article, is “punishable.”  The actual sentence that a defendant receives
is not relevant to the inquiry.  This is particularly important in the
plea bargaining context, where often the “bargain” is a discount from
the sentence that a defendant would likely have received if convicted
at trial, in exchange for forgoing trial.132  Thus, even if the defendant
receives much less prison time as a benefit of the bargain or receives
no prison time at all, the conviction can still be used against her later
for impeachment purposes under Rule 609.  The judge has discretion
to refuse to admit a prior felony conviction against a criminal defen-
dant under Rule 609’s balancing test, by which the court should con-
sider whether the probative value of the conviction outweighs its
prejudicial effect.133  In fact, the balancing test under Rule 609 for
criminal defendants is supposedly a more exacting variation on the
typical Rule 403 balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect.134
But despite courts’ ability to disallow the use of prior felony convic-
tions against criminal defendants, courts routinely admit these convic-
tions at trial.135  The routine admission of prior convictions against
defendants for impeachment is particularly troubling given that Con-
130. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (declining to include such a requirement).
131. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); Uviller, supra note 129, at 799 (explaining that Rule 609’s R
provision that a prior conviction is admissible if it is punishable by death or imprisonment
of more than one year allows admissibility if “the prior crime was a felony under the law of
the jurisdiction of commission”).
132. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 24 (1998).
133. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
134. See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to
Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 307–12
(2008) (offering a brief overview of Congress’s modified incorporation of the Rule 403
balancing test in Rule 609); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that “evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice”).
135. See Carodine, supra note 65, at 540 (explaining that “judges routinely admit evi- R
dence of testifying defendants’ prior convictions for impeachment purposes” (citing R.
Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 45
(1981))).
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gress expressly intended that courts apply a more rigid balancing test
for admitting such evidence against criminal defendants than for
other witnesses.136  Jeffrey Bellin, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, so-
lidified this point in an extensive examination of how courts have “cir-
cumvent[ed]” congressional will with respect to prior conviction
impeachment.137  He exposes the fact that although Rule 609 is sup-
posed to be “unflinchingly hostile” to the use of prior convictions
against criminal defendants, courts’ “reflexive approach to admitting
defendants’ prior convictions has become the norm.”138
It is important to note here that under Rule 609, where the ele-
ments required to establish a crime require proof of an act of dishon-
esty or false statement, the convictions are per se admissible against a
defendant, regardless of the punishment.139  So, Congress did not in-
tend to apply a balancing test with respect to these types of crimes.
Also, though the Rule reaches a wide range of convictions, it is limited
to those that were obtained within the preceding ten years, except
under the unusual circumstance where the probative value of the evi-
dence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect and the court de-
termines that the evidence should be admitted in the interests of
justice.140  Additionally, prior juvenile adjudications are inadmissible
against a criminal defendant.141  When a prosecutor uses a prior con-
viction against a defendant under Rule 609, she uses that conviction
for impeachment purposes to demonstrate that the defendant is not
truthful.142  The Rule does not permit, at least in theory, the use of the
prior convictions as evidence of general bad character.143
2. Controversy Surrounding Rule 609
Rule 609 embodies an “ancient” theory that “[f]elons of all de-
scriptions are forever afterward less truthful than other folk on any
subject.”144  Though the underlying theory of Rule 609 is indeed anti-
quated, the Rule itself survives and thrives in our justice system and
136. See Bellin, supra note 134, at 307 (“[T]he balancing test incorporated into the final R
version of Rule 609 distinctly favors criminal defendants . . . .”).
137. See id. at 293 (“[T]he federal courts are not merely out of step with commentators
on this issue [of prior conviction impeachment], but have also diverged from the intent of
Congress.”).
138. Id.
139. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
140. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
141. FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
142. Uviller, supra note 129, at 786, 794–95. R
143. See Carodine, supra note 65, at 538 (“Juries are not . . . supposed to use the prior R
convictions as evidence of the defendant’s bad character generally.”).
144. Uviller, supra note 129, at 803–04. R
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serves as a powerful weapon in a prosecutor’s arsenal against the
defendant.
Like plea bargaining, Rule 609 is highly controversial—arguably
the most controversial of all the rules of evidence—as some evidence
scholars have asserted.145  The use of prior convictions for impeach-
ment purposes has been the subject of numerous law review articles
and other legal commentary, much of which challenges the Rule’s ra-
tionale—that a felony conviction is proof of untruthful character.146
Even putting aside the tenuous link between prior felonious behavior
and truthfulness, it is difficult to deny that informing the jury of the
defendant’s prior convictions is highly prejudicial, as scholars have
recognized.147  The jury may very well convict the defendant on the
basis of the prior record and not on the basis of what actually oc-
curred in the present case.148  Defendants with criminal records, often
repeatedly targeted by the system,149 are more likely to be convicted
than those without a prior criminal record.150  Scholars and judges
have believed this to have been the case for some time, and recent
145. See, e.g., Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the
Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2295 (1994) (“No provision of the Federal
Rules of Evidence has sparked more controversy than Rule 609 . . . .”); Hornstein, supra
note 8, at 6 (“The issue [of impeachment through prior convictions] is perhaps one of the R
most controversial in the law of evidence.”).
146. See, e.g., Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation for Reform,
57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1988) (asserting that Rule 609 is flawed because of its discred-
ited “assumptions that criminal convictions reflect character”); Richard Friedman, Charac-
ter Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 637, 637–38 (1991) (“[E]vidence about prior bad acts . . . is almost certain to yield no
significant new information about [a person’s] truthtelling inclination in [a] specific
case.”); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b),
608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 153, 155–58 (1989) (claiming that evidence of other
crimes committed is always evidence of propensity to commit later crimes, but never of
specific intent); Uviller, supra note 129, at 802–15 (arguing that prior convictions are gen- R
erally irrelevant to veracity).
147. See, e.g., Cordray, supra note 9, at 498–99 (stating that “Rule 609 of the Federal R
Rules of Evidence provides one of the most potent, and potentially prejudicial, methods of
impeachment,” and noting that “[i]n a criminal case, when the defendant is impeached
with his prior convictions, it is widely recognized that the defendant faces a unique, and
often devastating, form of prejudice”).
148. Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How
Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (“It is widely
accepted that in all likelihood a jury will consider the evidence for improper purposes.”).
149. See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. R
150. Dodson, supra note 148, at 39, 41 n.421 (noting that prior records “increase the R
likelihood of conviction” and that jurors who know about prior convictions are “signifi-
cantly more likely to convict” a defendant than jurors without such information (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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empirical evidence, discussed below, supports those beliefs, particu-
larly in cases in which evidence against a defendant is weak.151
The current scheme under Rule 609 places a criminal defendant
in a no-win situation at trial.  The defendant can remain silent and not
testify, thus prejudicing her in the eyes of the jury for failing to tell her
side of the story.152  Alternatively, the defendant with a prior record
can face certain prejudice by testifying and being impeached with her
convictions.153  Effectively, then, Rule 609 impeachment provides
prosecutors with a route to “efficient” convictions by either keeping
defendants off the stand at trial or by forcing them to plead guilty and
forgo a trial altogether.154  Given the controversy surrounding Rule
609,155 it has garnered more debate than any other rule and has also
been the subject of much scholarly interest and criticism.156  In the
face of defendants’ dilemma, much criticism challenges the notion
that a prior felony conviction, especially one that did not require the
establishment of an act of dishonesty or false statement, is probative of
truthfulness.157  Moreover, depending on the nature of the crime,
there is the very real danger, almost an inevitability, that many jurors
will punish the defendant for her past crimes—regardless of whether
the evidence in the case at hand proves guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt—or for being a “bad” person generally.158
Given the degree of criticism of the Rule, its failure to ascertain
credibility with any reasonable measure of certainty, and the serious
potential to cause prejudice to criminal defendants, it is troubling that
it remains part of evidence law.  Even more troubling are the findings
151. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1353, 1356–57 (2009) (explaining that in cases with weak evidence, juries dispropor-
tionately rely on criminal records to convict, although in cases with strong evidence, they
do not); see also infra text accompanying notes 159–63. R
152. See Dodson, supra note 148, at 47 (“A jury is likely to draw a negative inference from R
the fact the defendant did not testify.”).
153. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 146, at 2–3. R
154. Dodson, supra note 148, at 4, 44–47 (stating that “[c]urrent rules generally allowing R
prior conviction evidence place a premium on efficiently convicting people,” and explain-
ing that these rules generally place defendants in the position of deciding between testify-
ing and having convictions admitted or not testifying and thus appearing guilty to the
jury).
155. See supra note 145. R
156. See supra note 146. R
157. Uviller, supra note 129, at 813. R
158. See, e.g., Cordray, supra note 9, at 498–99 (“Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evi- R
dence provides one of the most potent, and potentially prejudicial, methods of impeach-
ment . . . .  In a criminal case, when the defendant is impeached with his prior convictions,
it is widely recognized that the defendant faces a unique, and often devastating, form of
prejudice.”).
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of a recent study that provides empirical data supporting the long-
held belief that jurors misuse Rule 609 evidence against defendants.
Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Valerie Hans, both of whom are
empiricists, studied data from more than 300 criminal trials in four
large U.S. counties and concluded that there were “[s]tatistically sig-
nificant associations” between “the existence of a criminal record and
[a defendant’s] decision to testify at trial,” and, moreover, “in cases
with weak evidence, between the jury’s learning of a criminal record
and conviction.”159  They found that “[j]uries appear to rely on crimi-
nal records to convict when other evidence in the case normally would
not support conviction.”160  Specifically, Eisenberg and Hans discov-
ered that the effect of a prior record in cases that are “otherwise
weak . . . can increase the probability of conviction to over 50% when
the probability of conviction in similar cases without criminal records
is less than 20%.”161  Professors Eisenberg and Hans further note that
“[t]he criminal-record effect could be even stronger” than their find-
ings suggest.162  This possibility seems to be very real given that they
relied on jurors’ evaluation of the strength of the case and observed
that jurors may “incorporate” the fact of a defendant’s criminal record
into their “narrative account of the evidence in the case,” thus viewing
the case as stronger than it actually was.163
The legislative history of Rule 609 demonstrates that Congress
was fully aware of the Rule’s inherent prejudice.  Indeed, this
prejudice is precisely why Rule 609(a) was such a controversial rule
when it was proposed: It generated more discussion than any other
evidentiary rule.164  The proponents of the Rule seemed to view Rule
609 as part of an overall crime-fighting agenda.  This is evident in
comments by Senator McClellan.  McClellan, who along with Senators
Hruska, Roth, Talmadge, and Thurmond had proposed a much
stricter version of the Rule that would have admitted all prior convic-
tions, stated on the Senate floor:
We have gone pretty far already in trying to protect
criminals and granting every advantage to them against
society. . . .
159. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 151, at 1353. R
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1357.
162. Id. at 1388.
163. Id. at 1365–66.
164. Gold, supra note 145, at 2303 (noting that “[t]he extent of the floor debate in the R
House over Rule 609(a) far exceeded that relating to any other provision in all the pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence” (citing 120 CONG. REC. H2375–81 (daily ed. Feb. 6,
1974); 120 CONG. REC. H1414–15 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974))).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 25 28-MAY-10 13:44
2010] KEEPING IT REAL 525
. . . .
. . . Should society be denied the opportunity, in trying to protect
itself, in its effort to discover the truth, to show that the wit-
ness before it is a man who has committed such a crime and,
therefore, might be willing to now lie to a jury?165
The version of Rule 609 that was ultimately adopted has broad
applicability.  Of course, it applies to convictions obtained as the re-
sult of a full-blown criminal trial.  Additionally, the Rule applies to
convictions obtained through the plea bargaining process.  There is
simply no distinction in the language of the Rule between convictions
obtained after a full-blown trial and those obtained after a few min-
utes of plea negotiations.166  And courts have recognized that untried
convictions can be used for impeachment purposes under Rule
609.167  Thus, it is indeed striking that the criticisms of Rule 609 have
paid little to no attention to the fact that the overwhelming majority
of prior convictions are untried convictions.
165. 120 CONG. REC. 37,076 (1974) (emphasis added).
166. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (referring only to convictions without any reference to the
plea bargaining process).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1294 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A prose-
cutor may properly use a codefendant or coconspirator’s guilty plea to aid the jury in its
assessment of the codefendant or coconspirator’s credibility, but may not use the guilty
plea as substantive evidence of a defendant’s guilt.” (citations omitted)); Brewer v. City of
Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that guilty pleas, including no
contest pleas, can be used for impeachment purposes under Rule 609); United States v.
Sonny Mitchell Ctr., 934 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that a nolo contendere plea,
“‘a tacit confession of guilt,’” is admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609
(quoting Piassick v. United States, 253 F.2d 658, 661 (5th Cir. 1958))); United States v.
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that a plea of guilty is admissible
for impeachment purposes under Rule 609); People v. Buckner, 876 N.E.2d 87, 90–91 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007) (noting that under Illinois’s version of the prior conviction impeachment
rule, “[a]s a general rule, a defendant may cross-examine a witness who has pled guilty to
misdemeanor theft, a crime of dishonesty, about that conviction to impeach the witness’s
credibility” (citing People v. Spates, 395 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979))); Outback
Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 84–85 (Ind. 2006) (noting that Rule
609(a) “draws a bright line at conviction before a prior crime may be used to impeach a
witness”); Specht v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239, 240–41 (Ind. 2000) (noting that under Indiana’s
version of Rule 609, a guilty plea is admissible for impeachment purposes even when it has
not been reduced to a judgment); State v. Holleran, 197 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App.
2006) (noting that under Missouri’s version of the prior conviction impeachment rule,
“when a defendant testifies, he or she is subject to cross-examination and impeachment,
and his other prior criminal convictions, including guilty pleas, may be proved, by cross-
examination or by the record, to impeach his or her credibility.” (citations omitted)); Jewel
v. Commonwealth, 536 S.E.2d 905, 906 (Va. 2000) (stating that “[w]e have described a
guilty plea as ‘in reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punish-
ment fixed by law,’” and noting that, therefore, Virginia’s prior conviction impeachment
rule applies to plea bargains (quoting Peyton v. King, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (Va. 1969))).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 26 28-MAY-10 13:44
526 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:501
3. Plea Bargaining and Rule 609: Strong Allies
Rule 609 promotes the plea bargaining regime, which has become
the criminal justice system.  Many criminal defendants with prior fel-
ony convictions prefer to plea bargain, rather than take their chances
at trial, where they know that the jury is likely to hold their prior con-
victions against them as evidence of their guilt, regardless of the
strength of the prosecutor’s case.168  Rule 609 also promotes plea bar-
gaining by treating untried convictions the same as convictions result-
ing from trial, which I will refer to as “tried convictions.”169  The
distinction between untried convictions and tried convictions is not
insignificant.170  But under Rule 609, a prosecutor can offer untried
convictions to impeach a defendant just as she can offer tried convic-
tions.  Thus, the Rule, which treats tried convictions and untried con-
victions alike, gives plea bargaining a stamp of legitimacy.
There has been no in-depth consideration of the role of plea bar-
gaining in the vast majority of criminal convictions in this country and
how the reality of today’s plea bargaining system might actually under-
mine the validity of Rule 609 and its underlying rationale.  Professor
George Fisher, however, has recognized the degree to which the adop-
tion of the prior conviction impeachment rule, in its pre-Rule 609
form, actually facilitated the explosion of plea bargaining onto the
American criminal justice scene.171  In recounting the history of plea
bargaining, Professor Fisher noted that “[t]he upshot was that a law
that purported to grant defendants a new right to testify at trial in-
stead deprived those defendants who had criminal records of the right
to any meaningful trial, and left them with little alternative but to seek
the best plea bargain they could get.”172  In fact, “[t]he dramatic con-
version to a plea bargaining regime” began a relatively short period
after defendants gained the right to testify, and, in turn, the risk of
impeachment based on their prior convictions.173  Though there is no
formal recognition of this fact in the evidentiary rules, the prior con-
viction impeachment rule is a “strong all[y]” that aids in promoting
the plea bargaining system.174
168. See infra Part III.B.2.
169. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. R
170. See infra Part III.A.
171. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 107–08 (2003).
172. Id. at 107.
173. Id. at 109.
174. Id.
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Consistent with Professor Fisher’s analysis, empirical evidence
demonstrates that whether a defendant has a prior conviction is
among those “crucial considerations” that a criminal defendant and
her lawyer take into account when deciding whether to forgo a trial
and to accept a plea agreement.175  This should come as no surprise.
Good litigators, in both the civil and criminal arenas, will readily note
that the rules of evidence are important not only at trial, but also, and
perhaps more so, during the pre-trial stage of a case.  As one commen-
tator noted, lawyers are always operating in the “shadow of litigation,”
which makes the evidentiary rules very important outside the court-
room.176  Knowing beforehand the likelihood that certain informa-
tion will or will not be admissible significantly aids the evaluation of a
case’s strength.  Indeed, available data and common experience
demonstrate that Rule 609 is a very real threat to criminal defendants
with prior records; it is one that they consider—and which is often at
the forefront of their minds—in deciding whether to go to trial.177
The real fear of being impeached could dissuade many defendants
from taking the stand if they go to trial, and in a number of cases,
from even going to trial at all.178
Describing the prior conviction impeachment rule as allied with
the plea bargaining regime is not surprising when one considers that
those who plea bargain often tend to be alleged repeat offenders, or
those whom the system would call recidivists.179  In fact, most of the
criminal defendants in the system at a given time are people labeled
as recidivists.180  For example, “in 2002, in the nation’s seventy-five
largest counties, seventy-six percent of state-court felony defendants
had at least one prior arrest, fifty percent had five arrests or more,
fifty-nine percent had at least one prior conviction, and twenty-four
percent had five or more convictions.”181  Furthermore, “this recidivist
majority is overrepresented among the population of wrongfully ac-
175. DEBRA S. EMMELMAN, JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A STUDY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE WORK
41 (2003).
176. DAVID A. SKLANSKY, EVIDENCE: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND PROBLEMS 2 (2003).
177. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 151, at 1353 (explaining that, “[f]or testifying R
defendants with criminal records, juries learned of those records in about half of the
cases,” and in cases with weak evidence, there was a statistically significant association be-
tween the jury’s learning of a defendant’s criminal record and the jury’s convicting the
defendant).
178. Id.
179. See Bowers, supra note 8, at 1125 (explaining that repeat offenders, also referred to R
as “recidivists,” comprise the majority of criminal defendants).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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cused, because institutional biases select for erroneous arrest, prosecu-
tion, and trial conviction of recidivist defendants.”182
As I will discuss in the next Part, one of the most important adju-
dicative-type decisions that prosecutors make is the charging deci-
sion.183  The manner in which they often carry out this decision has
an inherent bias against defendants with a prior record.184  As a gen-
eral matter, when presented with a case, prosecutors “err on the side
of charging” because of “comity” concerns with respect to police de-
partments.185  They defer out of comity, or out of respect, to the find-
ings and will of the police.  The fact that police tend to round up “the
usual suspects” poses serious problems for persons with prior criminal
records.186  Indeed, the government expends great resources investi-
gating those with a reputation for being “bad actors.”187  Thus, de-
fendants with prior records are more likely than others to be
charged.188
Moreover, prosecutors tend to act on a “presumption of guilt”
whereby they resolve ambiguities and other problems in their cases in
favor of guilt.189  Presuming “that recidivists are guilty of some
crime . . . prosecutors are unlikely to exercise discretion to decline
prosecution” and therefore “[e]ven in the weakest cases, prosecutors
can go forward with charges and anticipate pleas because they know
that recidivists cannot easily fight charges at trial under existing evi-
dence rules,” particularly Rule 609.190  Thus, Rule 609 actually pro-
motes plea bargaining generally, and particularly in weak cases, and
works against innocent defendants.
Not only is Rule 609 a powerful tool in a prosecutor’s arsenal, but
the very applicability of the Rule to convictions obtained by plea bar-
gaining—that is, the fact that an untried conviction can be used
against a defendant in later criminal proceedings—promotes the sys-
tem by giving it a stamp of legitimacy without really questioning its
182. Id.
183. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
184. See infra notes 284–85 and accompanying text. R
185. Bowers, supra note 8, at 1126. R
186. See Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 675,
703 (2002–2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining why the police target
“the usual suspects” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
187. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110
YALE L.J. 733, 753 & n.27 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Bowers, supra note 8, at 1127; see also Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 151, at 1365 R
(noting that “[s]ome of the impact of [a] criminal record may occur at early stages of case
processing”).
189. Bowers, supra note 8, at 1126–27 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
190. Id. at 1127.
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fundamental fairness.  The remainder of this Article is devoted to the
task of questioning the fundamental fairness of using plea bargains as
evidence under Rule 609 and addressing ways in which we can disen-
tangle the current dysfunctional relationship between plea bargaining
and Rule 609.  Doing so will do much to improve the efficacy of the
rules of evidence in aiding the search for truth in criminal
proceedings.
III. “IMPEACHING” THE PLEA BARGAINING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES
This Part explores the fundamental fairness issues surrounding
the use of untried convictions to impeach criminal defendants
charged in subsequent cases.  I am concerned about the quality of
untried convictions as an evidentiary matter.  As mentioned earlier,
plea bargaining is one of the most controversial practices in the crimi-
nal system and has garnered much scholarly commentary, both in
favor of and against the practice.191  This Article does not neatly fit
within these two categories of “for” or “against” plea bargaining.  It is
not necessarily my goal in this Article to argue for the end of the prac-
tice.  But it is my goal to critique it as a source of evidence in subse-
quent cases and, in a larger sense, to critique the role of the
evidentiary rules in the plea bargaining regime.  While the evidentiary
rules can and do at times promote larger social policies,192 they must
do so while simultaneously staying true to the overarching goal of
truth-seeking and accuracy in trial proceedings.193
Given the substantial prejudice that a criminal defendant faces
once his prior convictions are revealed to the jury,194 it is of para-
mount importance to evaluate the quality of that evidence.  Even
though prior convictions are to be used technically for impeachment
purposes only, jurors are highly likely to disregard a court’s limiting
instructions and to use such convictions as substantive evidence of
guilt.195  Indeed, empirical data has exposed this problem.196  The re-
ality of how jurors really use prior conviction evidence strongly dic-
191. See supra Part II.
192. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. R
193. See infra Part III.B.
194. See supra Part II.B.2.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 159–60. R
196. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 151, at 1361 (“Although the defendant’s credibil- R
ity can be harmed by knowledge of a record, credibility does not appear to be the main way
that criminal record information affects the guilt judgments of jurors.  The experimental
research also suggests that limiting instructions are not a reliable method for eliminating
the negative impact of criminal records.”).
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tates that prior convictions must be trustworthy and reliable, not just in
theory, but in fact.  And I do not believe that juries are likely to under-
stand the unreliability of untried convictions and discount them even
if a court were to reveal that the impeaching conviction was the result
of a bargain.  As discussed later in Part IV, contrary to the reality of
what goes on with plea bargaining, many members of the public view
plea bargaining as the defendant getting off easily.  Juries may, then,
give even more weight to untried convictions.197  We must, therefore,
impeach the plea bargaining system as a source of evidence and re-
establish the evidence rules as a means by which we seek truth and
accuracy, particularly in criminal proceedings.198
There are some people, perhaps some of them judges, who will
be uncomfortable with the idea that a conviction, plea bargained or
not, was a sufficient basis on which to send someone to prison but is
qualitatively lacking in evidentiary value.  My response is that systems
should have internal checks on the quality of their output as well as
external checks.  There must be various points of internal quality con-
trol within the criminal system to come as close to perfection as possi-
ble.  And in each subsequent case, we should strive to improve upon
the process and not simply replicate and compound errors and injus-
tices.  A conviction should be of superior quality and reliability, as an
evidentiary matter, when its reach is far beyond the case from which it
resulted—as in the Rule 609 context—and when it can result in an
entirely new conviction with additional, and possibly even more se-
vere, penalties.199
One may inquire, how does the plea bargaining system fare when
it is impeached?  A common theme in criticisms of the plea bargain-
ing system and the indigent defense system, which is a significant part
of the bargaining system, is that as they stand today, there is a failure
to afford defendants fundamentally fair procedures with any degree
of satisfactory consistency.
A. The Qualitative Difference in “Untried Convictions” and “Tried
Convictions”
In Gordon v. United States,200 one of the cases that pre-dated but
laid the foundation for Rule 609, then-Judge Burger noted the differ-
ence between an untried conviction and one obtained after a trial in
197. See infra Part IV.B.
198. See infra Part III.B.
199. See infra Part IV.
200. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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which the defendant testified on his own behalf.201  Judge Burger ob-
served that untried convictions may have a “different” evidentiary
value than convictions obtained through the trial process.202  In
Gordon, and its companion case Luck v. United States,203 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit outlined
various factors that courts should consider in exercising their discre-
tion in determining the admissibility of prior convictions for impeach-
ment purposes.204  Judge Burger suggested that among those various
factors should be a consideration of whether the conviction was the
result of a trial or the result of a plea bargain.205  Even though the
Luck/Gordon doctrine has been incorporated into Rule 609 via the bal-
ancing test that judges are supposed to conduct,206 Judge Burger’s dis-
tinction between untried and tried convictions has largely been lost.
Also, some years ago, Professor David Shapiro argued that in civil
cases, plea bargained convictions should have only a rebuttable pre-
sumption of preclusive effect.207  The facts of a criminal case may be-
come an issue in a civil case, and the issue with which Professor
Shapiro dealt in his essay was the extent to which the guilty plea
should be used in a civil case to establish conclusively the elements of
the crime to which a party had pled guilty, which would be important
in determining civil liability.208  He was concerned that the plea bar-
gaining process did not yield the same results as trials would: “[I]f the
guilty plea process duplicated sufficiently the process of contested liti-
gation to yield substantially identical results, to yield a high probability
of legal guilt, preclusion might be warranted.  But it does not.”209  In-
deed, he cited to a study purporting to demonstrate that over twenty-
five percent of defendants who pled guilty would have been acquitted
201. Id at 940 n.8.
202. Id. (explaining that “[t]he relevance of prior convictions to credibility may well be
different . . . where conviction of the accused was by admission of guilt by a plea and . . .
where the accused affirmatively contested the charge and testifie[s]” because “[i]n the
latter situation the accused affirmatively puts his own veracity in issue when he testifies”).
203. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
204. See Gordon, 383 F.2d at 939–41 (describing when a court should admit a conviction
for purposes of impeachment); see also Luck, 348 F.2d at 769 (listing factors that might be
relevant when a court is determining whether to admit a conviction for impeachment
purposes).
205. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940 n.8.
206. E.g., United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
207. David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27,
49–50 (1984).
208. See id. at 30–35 (discussing “whether a guilty plea may have preclusive effect in a
later civil action”).
209. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
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at trial.210  The more recent studies that I discuss in this Article fur-
ther support this conclusion that he made over twenty-five years
ago.211
Theoretically, impeachment in a criminal case is much different
from issue preclusion in the civil context.  After all, in the context of
issue preclusion, the guilty plea will be used as substantive proof to
establish whatever elements are at issue.  Rule 609 is, of course, an
evidence rule that in theory is only about impeachment of credibility,
not substantive evidence of guilt.212
Judge Burger and Professor Shapiro’s observations about the dif-
ference between a conviction obtained in a trial setting and one ob-
tained through the plea bargaining process are apt.  There is indeed
something about the trial setting itself that lends far more legitimacy
and credibility to a conviction than plea negotiations, particularly in
the context of Rule 609.213  Professor Shapiro’s analysis with respect to
the issue preclusion context in civil cases is particularly useful here
also because, as discussed above, empirical data indicate that jurors
actually improperly use Rule 609 convictions as substantive evidence
of guilt.214  Thus, we should be even more concerned about the relia-
bility of the plea bargaining system as a source of evidence in the crim-
inal system.  The reality is that plea bargaining is inferior to the trial
process, which is central to the theory underlying Rule 609.215
1. The Centrality of the Trial Process to the Theory of Rule 609
Rule 609 is an exception to the rule against hearsay.216  A judg-
ment of conviction fits the classic definition: It is an out-of-court state-
ment (that is, it was not made in the current proceedings) now being
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (the matter being
that the defendant committed the underlying act for which she was
convicted).217  The exception in Rule 609 that allows the admissibility
of judgments from other courts, which would otherwise be deemed
210. Id. at 44–45 (citing Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Prac-
tices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1975)).
211. See infra Part III.A.2.
212. Some jurors continue to treat Rule 609 evidence as evidence of guilt, however.  See
supra Part II.B.2.
213. See infra Part III.A.1–2.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 159–63. R
215. See infra Part III.A.1.
216. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence, 70 MINN. L. REV. 979, 980 &
n.8 (1986) (noting that prior judgments, including prior criminal convictions, are
hearsay).
217. See id. at 980 & n.4 (defining hearsay).
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inadmissible hearsay, is based on the supposed reliability of the prior
court’s pronouncements.218  Those pronouncements are deemed reli-
able presumably because there is a presumption that the defendant
was afforded various constitutional protections and had a full and fair
opportunity to defend against the government’s charges.219  Indeed, it
has been noted that “despite its hearsay character, the evidence in-
volved [that is, the prior conviction] is peculiarly reliable” because
“[t]he seriousness of the charge . . . encourages its full litigation, and
the reasonable doubt standard of conviction ensures that the question
of guilt will be thoroughly considered.”220
This presumption is on its most firm standing when there was a
full-blown trial in which the defendant was represented by competent
counsel and had a full and fair opportunity to mount her defense
before a fair and impartial jury with a fair and impartial judge presid-
ing over the proceedings.  Ideally, the defendant is able to test the
prosecution’s case before the jury through mechanisms such as the
cross-examination of its witnesses, the challenging of the quality and
quantity of physical evidence, and the presentation of her own version
of the facts and evidence.  Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard
gives us comfort, as it is the highest standard of proof that we require
in any court proceeding.221  Additionally, the criminal system is an
adversarial system.  That model provides more assurances, in theory,
that we can have confidence in the outcomes: “Indeed, the premise of
our adversarial system is that the clash between partisan advocates pro-
duces reliable, accurate results.  In theory, then, if the adversary system is
working properly, innocent persons will not be convicted.”222
What I have described above is American criminal justice at its
best.  It is in such proceedings that we feel most confident that the
truth about the facts in issue will come to light and that innocent de-
fendants will be acquitted and guilty ones will be convicted.
218. See People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938, 946 (Cal. 1992) (describing evidence of a
prior conviction as being “‘peculiarly reliable’” (citation omitted)).
219. See id. (noting that a conviction guarantees the comprehensive consideration of
“the question of guilt” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Motomura, supra note 216, at 988–89 (noting that the rationale underlying hearsay excep- R
tions in rules of evidence allowing for the admissibility of prior convictions is that “criminal
convictions are reliable and trustworthy”).
220. Wheeler, 841 P.2d at 946 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Motomura, supra note 216, at 989 (noting that “[c]ourts and commentators cited the R
higher standard of proof required in criminal cases” as justifying an exception to the hear-
say rule for the admissibility of prior convictions into evidence).
221. See Motomura, supra note 216, at 989 (explaining that the high standard of proof R
for convictions after trial promotes reliability).
222. Uphoff, supra note 80, at 740 (emphasis added). R
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I am often asked when presenting the ideas in this Article about
the fact that trials often suffer from analogous problems that I high-
light regarding the plea bargaining process.  I understand that even in
the trial context, some of the deficiencies that I describe with respect
to plea bargaining—such as poor representation—may and often do
infect the proceedings.  Indeed, I have made the point about various
deficiencies in all aspects of the process (pre-trial and trial) affecting
the reliability of prior convictions previously in my race critique of
Rule 609.223  Thus, this Article does not propose the naive view that
the trial process is perfect.  The point, however, is not to idealize the
trial process as it currently stands and as it may play out in every case.
My goal here is to provide a reminder of why the criminal system was
initially considered a reliable source of Rule 609 evidence—because
of the trial process—and to demonstrate how the use of plea bargain-
ing has severely undercut the reliability of the criminal system.224  I
am demonstrating that Rule 609 operates in a manner that is contrary
to the evidentiary principles upon which it was conceived.
I would argue, moreover, that to the extent that aspects of the
criminal trial process have been denigrated, it has been in large part a
consequence of the policies that drive our overreliance on plea bar-
gaining.  A failure to adhere to our own ideals, often constitutionally
mandated, has corrupted the entire system.  We must start to conceive
of reliability as an overarching goal that should even take precedence
over judicial economy.225  I see this Article as fitting more broadly with
efforts to improve the overall reliability of the system, including the
trial process.  In fact, using Rule 609 as a check on poor plea bargain-
ing practices will, along with other reform measures, help to improve
not only the quality of plea bargaining but the quality of trials.  There
has to be an unraveling of the practices that produce unreliable re-
sults, and my focus here on plea bargaining and its relationship to
Rule 609 works toward that broader goal to improve all aspects of the
process.226
That being said, an imperfect trial process that possesses even
some of the attributes that I discuss in this Part is much better than
the plea bargaining practices that I discuss in this Article.  And the
better the process, the better the reliability for Rule 609 purposes.
But many worry about the guilty getting off.
223. See generally Carodine, supra note 65 (discussing certain problems with American R
criminal justice).
224. See infra Part III.A.2.
225. See infra Part III.B.
226. See infra Part IV.
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Purportedly, in an ideal trial setting, even if guilty defendants
somehow are able to establish reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jury, we can still place our confidence in this system because it is far
better for the guilty defendant to go free than for an innocent defen-
dant to be convicted.227
In an ideal system, plea bargaining would produce the same re-
sults that would occur in the (ideal) trial setting.228  Plea bargaining
would simply be a more efficient adjudicative process that still pro-
tected criminal defendants’ rights.  Guilty defendants would be appro-
priately charged and sentenced, while innocent defendants would not
be charged at all or, after consideration of the evidence, any charges
against them would be dropped.  Indeed, it has been argued that the
plea bargaining system is currently as good as, and sometimes better
than, the trial process.229
Judge Frank Easterbrook has stated that various steps in the plea
bargaining process “make plea bargaining at least as effective as trial
at separating the guilty from the innocent” and “[t]o the extent there
is a difference, negotiation between sophisticated persons unencum-
bered by the rules of evidence is superior.”230  Judge Easterbrook is
unconvinced “that there is a distinctive informational problem in the
process of bargaining.”231  In detailing why he sees trials as even infer-
ior to plea bargaining, he notes that “[t]rials come with a variety of
rules that exclude probative evidence thought to mislead jurors who
may not be perfect Bayesians.”232  Rather, during plea bargaining, ac-
cording to Judge Easterbrook, “the parties can consider all the evi-
dence that will come in at trial, and then some” and “[t]he persons
doing the considering are knowledgeable; prosecutors are more likely
than jurors to discount eyewitness accounts, and prosecutors know
from experience which details are most likely to separate guilt from
227. See Uphoff, supra note 80, at 740 (noting that “[o]ur system imposes this high bur- R
den on the prosecution [of requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt] and pro-
vides the defendant with so many rights because we believe that it is better to let the guilty
go free than to convict the innocent”).
228. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 600–01
(2005) (“[P]roponents [of the so-called shadow of trial theory] claim that plea bargaining
is justified because it largely mirrors the results that would have occurred after a highly
regulated trial process, discounted to reflect uncertainty and adjudication costs.  Plea bar-
gaining is efficient in punishing crime if it achieves the same overall results as trials while
expending fewer resources.  Likewise, plea bargains are not systematically unfair to defend-
ants if they only reflect discounted results from a trial process that we accept as legitimate.”
(internal quotation marks and footnote call numbers omitted)).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 230–37. R
230. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 1972. R
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1971.
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innocence.”233  He therefore concludes that “[t]he full panoply of in-
formation plus sophisticated actors are the standard ingredients of
adroit decisionmaking.”234
According to Judge Easterbrook, in a “perfect” plea bargaining
system, no innocent defendants would plead guilty.235  Even if they
are unsure that they will be acquitted at trial, they are highly moti-
vated to go to trial: “Prosecutors set high offers that will be attractive
only to the guilty; the innocent accused turn them down because of
their higher probability of success at trial.”236  He also addresses other
scholars’ concerns about the inability of innocent defendants to make
their cases to prosecutors.  Any difficulty in distinguishing between
guilt and innocence is not a problem with plea bargaining, he rea-
sons, but a problem with the trial process:
What disrupts this separation of the guilty from the innocent
is not a flaw in the bargaining process but a flaw at trial.
When the innocent bear a significant risk of conviction, the
bargaining reflects that anticipated outcome.  Innocent per-
sons are accused not because prosecutors are wicked but be-
cause these innocents appear to be guilty.237
As I demonstrate below, the reality is that in far too many in-
stances, plea bargaining is a “different” and far more inferior means
by which to dispose of criminal cases.238  The entire idea of “inno-
cence” and “appearance of innocence” that supporters of plea bar-
gaining adhere to wrongly takes the focus away from the process by
which we establish guilt and innocence.  As Professor Lloyd Weinreb
said some time ago in his blistering critique of the entire criminal
process, including plea bargaining, “The assumption of the Supreme
Court and others that ‘the innocent’ do not plead guilty treats crimi-
nal guilt too much as if it were unequivocal and entirely independent
of the process by which guilt is established.”239  In the Rule 609 con-
text, plea bargaining is a much more inferior source from which to
accept evidence than the trial process.240  Moreover, in many jurisdic-
tions the system both impliedly, and even expressly, does in fact co-
erce innocent defendants to plead guilty.241
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1969.
236. Id. at 1969–70.
237. Id. at 1970 (footnote call number omitted).
238. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. R
239. LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 86 (1977).
240. See infra Part III.A.2.
241. See infra Part III.A.2.
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Regardless of what one thinks about the theory that certain prior
criminal activity reveals an untruthful character, prior convictions can
only be useful for impeachment purposes to the extent that the un-
derlying conduct actually did occur.  It is the prior bad conduct that
impeaches.  The fact of conviction supposedly gives us the assurance
that the conduct actually occurred.242  Using plea bargained convic-
tions can substantially diminish this assurance, in varying degrees, de-
pending on the circumstances surrounding the negotiations.243
This next Section deals with the reality of plea bargaining by
pointing out some of the extensive problems that plague this regime,
and consequently, diminish the evidentiary value of prior convictions
for impeachment purposes.244  I am not attempting to make the argu-
ment that all plea bargaining is always inherently problematic; I am
simply exposing the reality of the system with well-documented evi-
dence of its failings in many respects.  Rule 609 largely relies on this
system—the system produces some ninety-five percent of convic-
tions245—as a lie detector, but there are serious questions regarding
the system’s reliability and ultimately its credibility.  Viewing the sys-
tem as a whole, we should ask ourselves if this is a system upon which
we want to rely for producing quality, reliable, and credible evi-
dence—the type of evidence for which the rules of evidence have a
strong preference.246
2. The Reality of Plea Bargaining in the United States
The plea bargaining process is not just part of the American crim-
inal process; rather, with over ninety-five percent of convictions result-
ing from plea bargains both at the state and federal levels, plea
bargaining is the American criminal process.247  Most of those convic-
tions are the result of so-called “negotiated” plea deals between prose-
cutors and the defendants, as opposed to guilty pleas entered absent
any type of negotiation between the parties.248  As I will discuss, how-
ever, the term “negotiated” is often an overstatement of what actually
242. See supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text. R
243. See infra Part III.A.2.
244. See infra Part III.A.2.
245. See infra text accompanying note 247. R
246. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Supreme Court’s Decision
to Recognize a Psychotherapist Privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996): The Mean-
ing of “Experience” and the Role of “Reason” Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1019, 1033 (1997) (noting the bias in the Federal Rules of Evidence for reliable
evidence).
247. Covey, supra note 10, at 1238. R
248. See Note, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1004, 1009–10 (1986).
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occurs.249  Typically, with plea bargains, the prosecutor agrees to dis-
miss a more serious charge or charges against a defendant in ex-
change for the defendant’s plea of guilty to a less serious charge or
charges and a shorter sentence or maybe even no jail time at all.250
Assurances about the quality of results in the criminal process di-
minish substantially with the current system of plea bargaining.  In-
deed, there exists much distrust of the plea bargaining system on the
part of the public.251  If plea bargaining produced the same results
that we would expect to see if every case went to trial, there would be
little question about the quality of untried convictions in comparison
to convictions obtained after a trial.  Given the widespread flaws in the
system, it is difficult to make a credible case that plea bargaining is a
suitable substitute for trials.
Professor Ronald Wright has raised concerns about the quality of
the federal plea bargaining system in particular.  He has articulated
what he calls the “trial distortion theory,” according to which “crimi-
nal courts in a jurisdiction produce too many dysfunctional guilty
pleas when those guilty pleas distort the pattern of outcomes that
would have resulted from trials.”252  His trial distortion theory focuses
on results and trends in jurisdictions, and thus takes a holistic view of
the system as opposed to examining individual cases.253  He writes, “A
healthy system would aspire to replicate through its guilty pleas the
same pattern of outcomes that trials would have produced.”254
Professor Wright sees a link between the high plea bargain rate
and the low acquittal rate as signifying a problem with the quality of
untried convictions: “Acquittals and dismissals play a starring role in
the trial distortion story.  These are cases that might have resulted in a
defendant’s freedom, and when a system starts to produce fewer ac-
quittals and fewer dismissals, it triggers a warning light about the
truth-finding function of the criminal justice system.”255  Can it be
then that virtually all defendants charged in the system are guilty?
Professor Wright seems to think not.  An accurate system ought to
have more acquittals and dismissals than we currently see.  Wright ar-
249. See infra Part III.A.2.c.
250. Davis, supra note 132, at 24. R
251. See Sergio Herzog, Plea Bargaining Practices: Less Covert, More Public Support?, 50
CRIME & DELINQ. 590, 590–92 (2004) (discussing the public distrust of the plea bargaining
process).
252. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 83 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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gues that in the federal system, which has a disproportionally low ac-
quittal rate,256 plea bargaining practices “distort the truth-finding
function of trials.”257  He notes that this problem is not unique to the
federal system, but rather is happening in state systems as well.258
With respect to the federal system, he theorizes that over the last few
decades or so, changes in federal sentencing law have made it far less
of an attractive option for defendants to maintain their innocence
and go to trial.259  It is now too costly for defendants to go to trial
given the great leverage the sentencing guidelines provide to prosecu-
tors.260  So, if given the option to plead, defendants perhaps wisely do
so.  And as I discuss below, prosecutors sometimes purposely refuse to
plead in strong cases just to obtain trial convictions, which creates the
erroneous public perception that the system does not make mis-
takes.261  In other words, those who should go to trial and prove their
innocence are not doing so, and a few cases that should not go to trial
will go, and prosecutors will easily win.  Therefore, Professor Wright’s
theory is quite persuasive.  Plea bargains have indeed corrupted the
trial process.
The so-called “triumph”262 of plea bargaining is particularly un-
settling given the mounting evidence that innocent as well as guilty
defendants routinely plead guilty.263  Indeed, central to the debate
over the plea bargaining regime is the so-called “innocence prob-
lem”—that is, the reality that our system has convicted a number of
innocent people, many of whom have served or are serving time in
prison and some tragically even being on death row.264  Innocent de-
fendants will often plead guilty rather than risk going to trial, being
convicted, and receiving more time than if they had just taken the
plea.265  As a matter of efficiency, prosecutors may be more likely to
charge innocent defendants because of the predominance of the plea
256. Id. at 84, 104.
257. Id. at 154.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 116–17.
260. Id. at 117.
261. See infra notes 316–19 and accompanying text. R
262. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 859 (claiming that “plea bargaining has triumphed”). R
263. See Covey, supra note 10, at 1239 (“However, mounting evidence suggests that guilty R
pleas are not reserved only for the guilty.”).
264. See Bowers, supra note 8, at 1124 (“There is no longer any serious question that R
innocent people are charged with and convicted of crimes.”).
265. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2306
(2006) (“Proponents of the plea bargaining system do not question the fact that sometimes
innocent defendants plead guilty.”).
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bargaining regime.  I will address the innocence problem more fully
below.266
At any rate, I am not suggesting that the only problem with plea
bargaining is the chance that innocent defendants plead guilty,
though that is the most unsettling one.  Even for guilty defendants,
many aspects of the process in the day-to-day grind of the disposal of
cases from the criminal docket are wholly repugnant to the laudable
ideals of the American criminal process.  The next Sections take a re-
alistic view of bargain-basement justice that seems to have the goal of
obtaining convictions by the cheapest means possible, even at the ex-
pense of gross inequities toward criminal defendants as a class.267  I
address the role of the law as well as the roles of the major actors in
the process—prosecutors,268 defense attorneys,269 and judges270—and
how, in carrying out their roles, they can and often do impede the
truth-seeking process.271
a. Role of the Law: Contractual Theory
Much has been made of the contractual theory of plea bargaining
as a justification for the practice.  After all, current legal standards
require that the defendant enter into any plea deal with a prosecutor
knowingly and voluntarily.272  But the “knowing and voluntary” re-
quirement has rightly been described as “anemic” because the facts
and supporting evidence needed to meet this low standard are “re-
markably thin,” and therefore, often supposedly “‘knowing’ and ‘vol-
untary’ guilty pleas are nevertheless coercive and unjust.”273  The
voluntariness aspect of the test is particularly troubling if one takes
into account how coercive the plea bargaining setting is in many in-
stances.  There can be a vast difference in the sentence that a defen-
dant might face if she plea bargains and the sentence that she might
face at trial if she rejects the plea.274  Despite this tremendous pres-
sure—choosing between a few years or taking the chance of life im-
prisonment, for example—all the defendant has to say are the “magic
266. See infra Part III.A.3.
267. See infra Part III.A.2.a–d.
268. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
269. See infra Part III.A.2.c.
270. See infra Part III.A.2.d.
271. For a discussion of police roles and how that relates to the criminal system’s relia-
bility, see Carodine, supra note 65, at 560–66. R
272. Wright, supra note 252, at 92–93. R
273. Id. at 82.
274. Id. at 93.
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words” to the judge at the plea hearing for her plea to be considered
voluntary.275
Even more troubling is that, in reality, there is often no genuine
concern for the truth.  According to Professor Wright, “[t]he strength
of the defendant’s available defense does not figure at all” and “[t]he
government’s evidence gets only the most perfunctory testing when
the prosecutor orally summarizes, in a few moments at the guilty plea
hearing, the ‘factual basis’ of the government’s case.”276
b. Prosecutors’ Roles: De Facto Adjudicators Who Answer to
No One
Prosecutors have virtually all of the power in the plea bargaining
process.277  A defendant is simply unable to plead to a lesser crime
unless the prosecutor has offered a deal.278  Indeed, courts have rec-
ognized that “ ‘[t]here is no constitutional right to a plea bargain, and
the decision whether to offer a plea bargain is a matter of
prosecutorial discretion.’”279  Many commentators agree that
“[p]rosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice
system.”280  Indeed, prosecutors have tremendous influence in deter-
mining criminal defendants’ ultimate convictions and sentences.281
Prosecutors’ daily decisions, which are “totally discretionary” and “vir-
tually unreviewable,” have a greater influence on the administration
of justice than that of any other actor in the criminal process.282
Prosecutorial decisions to charge and/or plea bargain are among
those discretionary calls that courts have largely determined to be un-
275. Id.
276. Id. at 93–94.
277. See Davis, supra note 132, at 25 (“Although prosecutors make important, influential R
decisions at other stages of the criminal process, the charging and plea bargaining stages
provide the most independent power and control and allow the least opportunity for coun-
terbalancing input from the defense.”).
278. Id. (“A criminal defendant cannot plead guilty to a less serious offense unless the
prosecutor decides to make a plea offer.”).
279. United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380, 1385–86 (9th Cir. 1985)).
280. E.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
5 (2007); Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709,
725 n.59 (2006) (“Mandatory minimum sentences and the overwhelming prevalence of
plea bargains have arguably made federal prosecutors more powerful than judges; once
the prosecutor decides which offense to charge, the prosecutor has, in effect, locked in a
very narrow range of discretion for the judge in deciding the sentence.”).
281. Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 951,
964–65 (2006) (“[T]he growing literature on plea bargaining recognizes the important
role of prosecutors and prosecutorial discretion in determining actual sentences.” (citing
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 10, at 2470–76)). R
282. DAVIS, supra note 280, at 5. R
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reviewable.283  While many prosecutors no doubt strive for and in
many respects achieve some degree of equity in the criminal process,
there is growing evidence indicating that many others use their discre-
tion in ways that yield inequitable results.284  Often defendants who
have committed similar crimes—or even the same crimes—receive
vastly different treatment from prosecutors.285
Some criminal procedure scholars have made the argument that
prosecutors are the “primary adjudicators of the American criminal
justice system.”286  In so many ways, this is a true statement because
prosecutors have de facto authority to adjudge guilt and innocence.
Consider the charging decision.  It is up to the prosecutor to deter-
mine who is charged and who is not charged, whether to offer the
persons charged any type of deal, and, if she so elects, how much of a
deal to offer.287  The decision whether to charge a defendant is likely
to be the single most important decision that the prosecutor makes,
given that “[i]n conjunction with the plea bargaining process, the
charging decision almost predetermines the outcome of a criminal case”
in terms of guilt or acquittal, and, in many instances, even determines
the defendant’s sentence.288
The charging decision is not the only duty that is consistent with
the prosecutor-as-adjudicator model.  There are various other features
283. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal
Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1936 (2006) (ex-
plaining that “[l]egal rules grant broad powers to prosecutors, including the power to de-
cide which cases to prosecute, to recommend bail, to dismiss or revise charges after the
original filing, to negotiate guilty pleas to less serious charges than might be provable in
court, and to recommend sentences,” yet it “is difficult to convince judges to interfere with
prosecutor charging decisions”).
284. DAVIS, supra note 280, at 5 (using individual examples as evidence of the inequity R
resulting from prosecutorial discretion).
285. Id. at 3–4 (noting the disparity in sentences between Andrew Klepper, arrested for
“attacking a woman with a baseball bat, sodomizing her at knifepoint with the same bat,
and stealing over $2,000 from her,” who received only probation and time at an out-of-state
facility for troubled youth, and that of his much less involved accomplices, both of whom
served jail time).
286. E.g., Ma´ximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 224 (2006);
see also Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 749, 758 (2003) (noting that “[p]rosecutors are the exclusive gatekeepers over
federal court”).
287. See Langer, supra note 286, at 224–25 (acknowledging that prosecutors’ power with R
respect to charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing makes them “de facto adjudicators,”
but opining that this is true only in cases where their plea bargain offers “are coercive”).
288. Davis, supra note 132, at 23 (emphasis added) (footnote call number omitted). R
Furthermore, the prosecutor’s power over sentencing is extensive due to the federal sen-
tencing guidelines in federal court, which “virtually eliminate judicial discretion,” and be-
cause the penalty range is set by the initial charging decision in state courts.  Id. at 23–24.
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of the American criminal justice system that, as a general matter, are
consistent with this model.  In jurisdictions across the country that
have other screening processes for cases (such as the grand jury) in-
tended to serve as checks on the prosecutor’s authority, the proce-
dures often amount to nothing more than a “rubber stamp” on
prosecutorial decisions.289  The prosecutor’s activities at the pre-trial
stage are completely informal and largely unsupervised by the
courts.290  Even when there are guilty pleas, in most jurisdictions, the
court’s inquiry into the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea is cur-
sory at best.291  Given that defendants quite often feel they have no
choice but to accept the prosecutor’s deal, the prosecutor’s plea deci-
sion will effectively be the final adjudicatory decision in a great major-
ity of cases.292  To summarize:
[S]ince in the Prosecutorial Adjudication System the prose-
cutor is the sole de facto adjudicator of the case, dismissals
and final plea proposals are the two ways in which the prose-
cutor acquits or convicts criminal defendants.  When the
prosecutor decides to dismiss charges against a defendant,
the prosecutor effectively acquits the defendant.  When the
prosecutor makes her final coercive plea proposal, the prose-
cutor effectively convicts the defendant of a specific charge
or charges.293
Having prosecutors act as the primary adjudicators in the vast ma-
jority of cases, with little oversight or accountability, raises concerns
about how their various individual biases affect their day-to-day deci-
sionmaking—much of which is hidden from the public eye.  Indeed,
289. Id. at 23 (“Because the sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing laws virtu-
ally eliminate judicial discretion, the prosecutor often effectively determines the defen-
dant’s sentence at the charging stage of the process, if the defendant is eventually found
guilty.” (footnote call number omitted)).  An example of an alternative screening process
is the grand jury.  Davis notes the following, however: “Although some state courts have
some form of sentencing guidelines, most states give judges more discretion in determin-
ing the sentence for a convicted defendant.  Nonetheless, the range of penalties is set by
the initial charging decision.” Id. at 23–24 (footnote call number omitted).
290. See id. at 20–21 (explaining that “[t]he deficiency of prosecutorial discretion lies
not in its existence, but in the randomness and arbitrariness of its application,” as “[s]elf-
regulation by prosecution offices is largely nonexistent or ineffective, and Supreme Court
jurisprudence has protected prosecutors from both public and judicial scrutiny” (footnote
call number omitted)).
291. See id. at 24–25 (explaining that “[a]lthough the judge must approve plea bargains
in most jurisdictions, judges routinely approve these agreements because they expedite the
process by disposing of criminal cases without the time and expense of a trial”).
292. See id. at 25 (noting that the defense attorney’s power is effectively limited to at-
tempting to negotiate the best deal possible for a client, as the prosecutor effectively makes
the ultimate decision).
293. Langer, supra note 286, at 250. R
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one of the most significant aspects of plea bargaining that undermines
public confidence in the system’s credibility and reliability is its clan-
destine nature.  Much of the screening process and the negotiations
that lead to untried convictions are shrouded in secrecy.294  Indeed,
Professor Bibas has noted the following:
Plea bargaining usually occurs in conference rooms, court-
room hallways, or on private telephone calls instead of open
court.  Important conferences take place at sidebar or in
judges’ chambers.  Public jury trials are the exception, not
the rule.
Even those hearings that are technically open to public
view are in practice obscure.  Hearings are often scheduled
by conference call or orders tucked away in dockets, and
court clerks do not publicize schedules.  Plea and sentencing
hearings are usually mere formalities that rubber-stamp bar-
gains struck in secret.295
It is undeniable that “[p]rosecutors can [and do] charge a hand-
ful of defendants and ignore hundreds of thousands of violators.”296
What we will often never discover is what went into the prosecutors’
decisions to let some violators “off the hook” and aggressively pursue
others.  How much of a factor was the prosecutor’s perception of the
strength of the case?  How much of a factor was the prosecutor’s per-
ception of the potential defendants?  To what extent did the prosecu-
tor identify or not identify with the defendant and/or victim?
Now, of course, we may never know what affected a jury’s deci-
sionmaking process if they choose not to talk about their delibera-
tions.  Their deliberations are also vigorously protected by the rules of
evidence.297  But we do have access to the same information to which
the jury had access; thus, we can have more (or less) confidence in
294. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 676 (2006) (noting the secrecy surrounding plea bargaining with re-
spect to tax evasion laws); Samuel Walker, Too Many Sticks, Not Enough Carrots: Limits and
New Opportunities in American Crime Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 430, 450 (2006) (observing
that “it is entirely possible . . . that a prosecutor’s office handles plea bargains in a fair and
evenhanded manner, but that because of the secrecy surrounding plea negotiations many
people believe them to be unfair and unreasonable”).
295. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 923–24 (2006) (footnote call numbers omitted).
296. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781,
791 (2006).
297. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indict-
ment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith.”).
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their decisionmaking in light of the actual evidence in the case.  Fur-
thermore, judges have the ability to throw out cases where there is
insufficient evidence—keeping the case from ever reaching the jury
deliberation room—or later to throw out the jury’s verdict if there was
insufficient evidence.298  The public nature of trial records acts as a
check on quality control and reliability in the process.
Unlike in a typical trial where the transcript is readily available,
the public simply lacks access to the vital information that reflects the
makings of the vast majority of criminal convictions, which, of course,
happen in the plea bargaining process.299  So, for example, with a
prosecutor’s decision not to charge a defendant (an effective acquit-
tal), who would have access to such information?  Unless the crime
has attracted some type of media attention, generally no one other
than the potential defendant and the victim would have knowledge of
this very crucial decision by the prosecutor.300  Thus, the decision not
to prosecute—essentially to acquit—just as the decision to prosecute
and coerce a plea—effectively convicting—is usually immune not just
from judicial review, but from any type of review by anyone.301  Con-
trast this reality with that of public trials in which the evidence in the
case is available not just for the jury, but for the entire public, and
there are standards by which judges admonish juries to consider the
strength of the evidence.302  Generally, there are no set methods that
prosecutors must use in carrying out their adjudicative function.303
These aspects of trial—the public nature, use of standards, and for-
mality—lend far more credibility to trial practice than that seen in
plea bargaining.
I am not asserting that all prosecutors have unsavory motives in
carrying out their duties.  Much of the inequity that prosecutors per-
298. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1354 (2008).
299. See id. at 1353–54 (“Unless the crime received media attention and the press has
followed the prosecutor’s investigation or the victim can somehow raise the profile of the
case, the public and elected officials will have no knowledge of the facts that support bring-
ing charges.”).
300. Id.
301. See id. at 1353 (“Put another way, one reason why prosecutors have not received the
same scrutiny as these other actors may be that fewer noteworthy examples of improper
exercises of discretion come to the public’s attention because a prosecutor’s decision not
to charge is sequestered from any kind of review, not just judicial review.”).
302. See id. at 1354 (comparing prosecutorial decisions with those of juries and pardons,
which occur in a public forum making abuse easier to see).
303. See id. at 1351–52 (“Prosecutors need not follow any particular protocols before
reaching a decision not to bring charges, nor must they provide reasons for their
decision.”).
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petuate stems from the economic reality in which they operate.304
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion, like plea bargaining itself,
has been described as “a kind of unpleasant necessity.”305  As Profes-
sor Angela Davis, who has often criticized prosecutorial discretion, has
noted, “Despite its potential abuse . . . prosecutorial discretion is nec-
essary.  It is difficult to imagine a fair and workable system that does
not include some level of measured discretion in the prosecutorial
process.”306
Still, she has been careful to point out fundamental problems
with this aspect of the criminal process: “The deficiency of
prosecutorial discretion lies not in its existence, but in the random-
ness and arbitrariness of its application.  Even in prosecution offices
that promulgate general policies for the prosecution of criminal cases,
there is no effective mechanism for enforcement or public accounta-
bility.”307  Prosecutors do not regulate themselves generally, and Su-
preme Court precedent shields them from judicial scrutiny.308  Even
prosecutors, relying on the public to elect them, are able to act with-
out much accountability “in part because their most important re-
sponsibilities—particularly the charging and plea bargaining
decisions—are shielded from public view.”309
Just as there are too many criminal cases to go to trial efficiently,
there are also too many crimes for the system to process efficiently.310
Simply put, the prosecutor has limited time and resources to go after
everyone who has committed a crime.311  In fact, prosecutors dismiss
most cases that come across their desks.312  Now, it is also true that
various other factors, in addition to pure economics, play into the
prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute a case; such factors include po-
tential political ramifications of the case, the prosecutor’s own private
interests in pursuing the case, the interests of the victim, the defen-
dant’s history (personal, professional, criminal, or otherwise), the na-
304. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 265, at 2308 (explaining that the limited resources of R
prosecutors contributes to why they are unable to prosecute all crimes that occur).
305. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2136 (1998).
306. Davis, supra note 132, at 20. R
307. Id. at 20–21 (footnote call number omitted).
308. Id.
309. DAVIS, supra note 280, at 5. R
310. See Davis, supra note 132, at 20–21 (noting that prosecutorial discretion is necessary R
for a fair system).
311. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 265, at 2308 (noting that prosecutors screen cases be- R
cause they have limited resources and the criminal process is complex).
312. Id.
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ture of the alleged crime, and several others.313  All of these issues
raise concerns about the credibility of convictions as evidence in sub-
sequent cases.314  Can we really be assured to some reasonable degree
of certainty that the evidence that led the prosecutor to charge, and
ultimately effectuate plea convictions, rose to the level of reliability
such that the conviction should be given what is essentially double
dipping power under Rule 609?315
In the prosecutor’s decision whether to charge and then offer a
plea deal, the strength of the case against a defendant in reality might
not factor at all or might be factored in an undesirable and repugnant
manner.316  With the knowledge that nearly all cases will end in plea
bargains, the prosecutor has little incentive to consider the actual
strength of a case in determining whether to charge the defendant.317
And often when they have a strong case, prosecutors are more likely
to take those cases to trial than plea bargain: “Self-interest, in contrast,
pushes prosecutors toward trying the strongest cases.  Prosecutors can
discourage defendants in strong cases from pleading guilty by refusing
to make any concessions, while they can make irresistible offers in
weak cases.”318  With weaker, more ambiguous cases, prosecutors are
more likely to plea bargain with defendants and “[t]hus, instead of
allowing juries to air and wrestle with the hard, troubling cases, prose-
cutors may hide them from view.”319  Aside from protecting their con-
viction rate, which has been shown to be quite important to most
prosecutors,320 they may also have other motives that serve as protec-
tion of the system at large:
If, for example, prosecutors bargain away most cases involv-
ing dubious confessions, they avert public scrutiny of police
interrogation tactics.  If they buy off credible claims of inno-
cence cheaply, they cover up faulty investigations that mistak-
313. Id.; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1240–41 (1999)
(listing various factors that prosecutors might consider in the charging and/or plea bar-
gaining process).
314. See Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal Rules of
Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REV. 533, 549 (1992) (suggesting that there are “signifi-
cant questions” about the probative value of prior convictions).
315. See id. (questioning the reliability of prior convictions).
316. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 265, at 2307 (suggesting that because of the availability of R
plea bargaining, “the strength of evidence of any given case becomes less important to the
prosecution”).
317. Id.
318. Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 10, at 2473 (footnote call number R
omitted).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 2471.
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enly target innocent suspects.  By pressing the easiest cases,
prosecutors turn jury trials into rubber stamps or mere
formalities.321
The counterintuitive manner in which some prosecutors proceed
based on the strength or weakness of cases322 severely undermines the
quality of untried convictions.  Untried convictions will be less relia-
ble, then, because those cases will tend to be weaker, which raises the
serious question as to whether the defendant actually committed the
charged offense.323  Recall that the theory of Rule 609 is that someone
who has committed an act that rises to the level of a felony or a crime
that requires proof of an act of dishonesty or false statement is less
truthful than someone who has not committed such an act.324  It is
crucial for the Rule’s effectiveness that the act have actually occurred,
and we have much less assurance of this with many plea bargains than
we do with trial convictions.
c. Defense Attorneys’ Roles and the Special Problem of Indigent
Defendants
As do prosecutors, defense attorneys play a major role in the plea
bargaining process,325 and it is important to consider that role when
evaluating the quality of convictions produced in this system.  The ef-
fective assistance of competent defense counsel is one of the surest
means by which to ensure the accuracy of the criminal process.326
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he Sixth Amendment recog-
nizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions coun-
sel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system
321. Id. at 2473.
322. See id. at 2472 (“This dynamic [of prosecutors pushing strong cases to trial to boost
reputation] is the opposite of what one might expect: strong cases should plead guilty
because trial is hopeless, while weak cases have genuine disputes that merit resolution at
trial.”).
323. See Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal
Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 522–23
(1998) (suggesting that in California, plea bargains may be a result of incomplete informa-
tion about the strength of the charges, and defense counsel may risk not achieving reliable
“legal truth” (internal quotation marks omitted)); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bar-
gaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15–16 (1978) (likening the factual unreliability of the plea
bargain to that of a tortured confession).
324. See Okun, supra note 314, at 537–38, 545–46 (suggesting that the credibility of a R
convicted felon is less than that of someone who has not been convicted of a criminal act).
325. See Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 10, at 2476 (explaining that “like pros- R
ecutors, defense lawyers prefer to avoid losing cases at trial, which would harm their
reputations”).
326. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (discussing the importance
of effective assistance of counsel).
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to produce just results.”327  Indeed, one commentator has observed
the following:
The Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of coun-
sel assures a fair trial by placing the adversaries on a relatively
equal playing field, even where a defendant is indigent and
the government has essentially unlimited resources at its
disposal.
In reality, the system rarely operates in this manner.328
One of the most important factors to remember about the de-
fense side of the criminal process is that in an overwhelming majority
of cases, it is the government itself that provides (or fails to provide)
representation through the indigent defender system.329  The crimi-
nal system is in the business of convicting poor people and many
through guilty pleas.330  Poverty, often along with race, equates with
guilt.331
An unfortunate truth in our criminal justice system is that the
majority of criminal defendants in the state and federal systems are
indigent.332  In over eighty percent of felony cases at the state level,
the defendants are indigent.333  This number is probably higher be-
cause, as discussed below, many people who most reasonable persons
327. Id.
328. Klein, supra note 9, at 2030 (emphasis added) (footnote call number omitted); see R
also Uphoff, supra note 80, at 741 (“[I]f the adversarial system is to function properly, a R
defendant must be provided the effective assistance of counsel.”).
329. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 690
(2006) (noting that most criminal trial participants are “on the government payroll”).
330. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN.
L. REV. 85, 92–93 (2007) (suggesting that indigent defense lawyers often pressure their
clients to accept guilty pleas).
331. See Wright, supra note 252, at 149–50 (suggesting that race or ethnicity correlates R
with plea negotiations).
332. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 172 (2007) (noting that most criminal
defendants are “young, poor, of color, nonviolent, and/or addicted to drugs or alcohol”);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1988 (1992) (noting
that “[o]nly a minority of criminal defense attorneys (as few as twenty percent in many
urban jurisdictions) are retained by paying clients”); Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 329, at R
690 (noting that “the vast majority of criminal defendants are indigent”); Kate Stith, The
Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1446
(2008) (noting that “most federal defendants are indigent”).
333. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
about “eight out of ten state felony defendants use court-appointed lawyers” (citing
HARLOW, supra note 107, at 1, 5)); Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 329, at 690 (noting that R
over eighty percent of state defendants are indigent).
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would deem indigent are not poor enough to qualify for indigent de-
fender services.334
At any rate, of those indigent defendants who have court-ap-
pointed counsel, around seventy percent plead guilty, and of those
convicted, around seventy percent are incarcerated.335  And there is
widespread agreement that the system for indigent defense, as a
whole, in this country is appallingly under-funded.336  Of course,
there are some defendants who are wealthy and tend to enjoy a higher
quality of legal representation.337  There are also some jurisdictions
that provide appropriate resources for their indigent defender pro-
grams.338  For example, the federal indigent defender system is better
funded and less burdened than most state systems.339  Still, only
around five percent of defendants in this country are processed in the
federal system, and the vast majority of criminal cases are tried in state
criminal systems.340  Thus, most Rule 609 evidence comes from under-
funded state systems—this evidence, regardless of the jurisdiction
from which it came, can be admitted against a defendant in both fed-
eral and state court.341
Make no mistake about it: Money can and often will buy a better
result for defendants who can afford private counsel.342  It is true that
the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics released a report finding that
the conviction rates for defendants with “publicly financed” counsel
and those with private counsel were about the same;343 however, the
report also noted that defendants with private attorneys were less
334. See, e.g., Uphoff, supra note 80, at 765 (suggesting that because the financial eligibil- R
ity threshold in Wisconsin is set at only thirty-three percent of the federal poverty guide-
lines, thousands of poor people are deemed ineligible for indigent defense).
335. Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 140 (citing HARLOW, supra note 107, at 6 tbls.10–11). R
336. Gershowitz, supra note 330, at 91. R
337. See Uphoff, supra note 80, at 747–48 (noting that wealthy defendants can hire attor- R
neys who have more time to better prepare and defend and can choose to hire someone
else if dissatisfied).
338. Id. at 742–43, 764–65.
339. Id. at 742 n.14 (“The federal criminal justice system handles far fewer cases and
generally provides indigent defendants with counsel who are better paid, have more man-
ageable case loads, and have greater access to investigative services and experts.”).
340. Id. (citing HARLOW, supra note 107, at 4). R
341. See, e.g., United States v. Kane, 944 F.2d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding no
error in a trial court’s admission of a state court conviction to impeach a defendant’s credi-
bility); Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1018 (Ind. 1998) (finding no error in admission of
an out-of-state conviction to impeach a defendant’s credibility).
342. See Uphoff, supra note 80, at 747–48 (explaining that money helps defendants hire R
attorneys who have time to research and who can enlist the help of others, and enables
defendants to hire a new attorney if dissatisfied).
343. HARLOW, supra note 107, at 1. R
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likely than indigent defendants to receive prison time.344  Moreover,
those defendants with private attorneys had greater access to their at-
torneys.345  This report, alongside other data collected on the ground
about the plea bargaining process, raises the question as to whether
the indigent defendants were over-convicted.346  One wonders
whether their rates of conviction would be lower if they had the same
quality of representation.
Not only can money buy excellent representation at the trial
stage, but as one commentator has noted, “[M]oney buys wealthier
defendants more leverage in the plea-bargaining process.”347  It is
quite frequently the case that “well-paid defense counsel can push
more aggressively in the bargaining process because both [defense]
counsel and the prosecutor know that [defense] counsel has the abil-
ity, time, and incentive to push forward to trial if a favorable bargain is
not struck.”348  Additionally, money affords wealthy defendants with
substantial power and leverage in their relationships with their own at-
torneys.  They can avoid what indigent defendants so often cannot—
yielding to intense pressure by defense counsel to accept plea deals.349
If unhappy with their attorneys, wealthy defendants have the option to
hire new counsel.350
The story of Andrew Klepper, the son of a lawyer, demonstrates
how money can buy a good deal and leverage within the system.351
Klepper was arrested for allegedly beating a woman with a baseball bat
and sodomizing her with that bat while threatening her with a
knife.352  His accomplices, whose actions were not as culpable as Klep-
per’s, went to jail.353  But Klepper was able to plead guilty to lesser
charges, get probation, and check into a facility for troubled youth at
the expense of his parents.354
Poor defendants are forced either to rely on the indigent defense
system, which is often under-funded, or to attempt, often in vain, to
344. Id. at 3–4.
345. Id. at 8 (noting that prison inmates spoke to their court-appointed attorneys later
and less frequently than those with private lawyers).
346. See John R. Lott, Jr., Should the Wealthy Be Able to “Buy Justice”?, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1307,
1314 (1987) (noting that “the probability of conviction is lower for wealthy individuals”).
347. Uphoff, supra note 80, at 748. R
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See DAVIS, supra note 280, at 3–5 (discussing the Andrew Klepper case as well as a R
public defender’s personal experience).
352. Id. at 3.
353. Id. at 3–4.
354. Id. at 3.
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scrape together funds to pay for their own counsel.355  Indeed, many
working poor defendants, who barely make enough money to feed
themselves and their families, make too much to qualify for indigent
defender status in the criminal system.356  Those truly unfortunate in-
dividuals really have no choice—they cannot afford an attorney and the
government refuses to provide them with one.  Plea bargaining is
their only real option.357  As one commentator put it, “[i]n the plea
bargain setting, the lamentable quality of legal representation means
that most indigent defendants cannot see any realistic way out of the
plea bargain trap.”358
To be sure, there are defendants who plead guilty who are in fact
guilty.  Some, including at least one Supreme Court Justice, even be-
lieve that nearly all defendants who plead guilty do so because they
are in fact guilty.359  However, an alarming number of cases are com-
ing to our attention in which defendants, particularly poor defend-
ants, have been “railroaded” into accepting plea bargains when they
are in fact innocent of any wrongdoing or when, even if guilty of some
crime, they deserve much less than the bargained-for sentence.360
Their stories are indeed compelling.  Take, for example, the dis-
turbing story of an indigent defendant who was convinced on the eve
of trial to plead guilty—as that was the “only hope” for his co-defen-
dant wife to be acquitted of child rape.361  According to a witness,
“[t]he lawyer did no investigation and did not meet with the jailed
client prior to trial, despite the client’s repeated requests.”362  So, the
defendant pled guilty to multiple child rape charges and was sen-
tenced to forty-five years in prison.363  His wife was, nevertheless,
355. See Uphoff, supra note 80, at 754 (“Indigent defendants represented by overworked R
public defenders or poorly compensated appointed counsel often experience the same
dismal representation provided to the working poor who have scraped up a minimal re-
tainer to hire counsel.” (footnote call number omitted)).
356. See id. at 749.
357. Id. at 763.
358. Michael Tigar, Lawyers, Jails, and the Law’s Fake Bargains, MONTHLY REV., July 2001,
at 29, 38.
359. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663,
663 (2007) (“Almost all criminal defendants plead guilty, and almost all of them do so
because they are guilty.”); see also supra text accompanying note 18. R
360. Tigar, supra note 358, at 38. R
361. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, A REPORT ON THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEED-
INGS 12 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] (internal quotation marks
omitted).
362. Id.
363. Id.
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found guilty at trial.364  After serving five years in prison, he was re-
leased when an investigation revealed that he was indeed innocent of
the charges.365
Sometimes the plea system causes an injustice even though the
defendant may be guilty of committing some crime—though not a
crime as serious as the charge and sentence ultimately reflect.  Con-
sider the story of Ronald Barnett, a mentally ill defendant, who en-
tered a guilty plea on the day of his trial for arson because his court-
appointed lawyer had no witnesses and was completely unprepared
for trial.366  Hoping for “leniency,” he entered a plea of guilty, but
instead of getting the leniency for which he hoped, he received a
twenty year prison sentence.367  It turns out that Barnett actually had a
good defense: He suffered from such severe depression that he had
suicidal thoughts and was prescribed medication.368  Unable to afford
his medication after losing his job, he stopped taking it and then “ab-
rupt[ly] resum[ed]” taking it just two days before the fire, which, ac-
cording to expert psychiatrists who evaluated him, caused him to
attempt suicide in what was the alleged act of arson in which no one
was hurt.369
Barnett studied Georgia law himself while in prison and learned
that he could have his plea withdrawn after hearing the prosecutor
recommend the long sentence.370  His court-appointed lawyer “admit-
ted he had not known the plea could be withdrawn.”371  Determined
to have his guilty plea withdrawn, he proceeded pro se on appeal, and
the appellate court threw out his guilty plea and granted him a new
trial.372  The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported the following: “For
more than a year after the ruling in his favor [throwing out the plea],
Barnett was in jail awaiting a trial.  His case seemed to languish after
his defense was handed over to a state office, where it was transferred
between lawyers because of budget cuts.”373
Barnett engaged in his own “letter-writing campaign” from jail by
“sending voluminous handwritten arguments studded with legal cita-
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. David Simpson, Arson Plea May Open Door to Parole, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 2, 2007,
at D16.
367. Id.
368. David Simpson, Man Waits 4 Years for Day in Court, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 26, 2007,
at D3.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Simpson, supra note 366. R
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tions to judges, lawyers and the news media.”374  His ability to have his
original plea withdrawn as a pro se defendant navigating through the
Georgia criminal process is “very unusual,” according to Stephen
Bright of the Southern Center for Human Rights.375  Bright noted
that Barnett’s case is an example of the influence of money on the
quality of defense.376  Someone who could afford to hire an attorney
would not have experienced these problems, according to Bright.377
As Barnett told the Atlanta newspaper, he had to “tak[e] on the big
guns with a cap pistol.”378  Fortunately for him, the media gave him a
voice.  For far too many other defendants, they simply have no voice
and thus no weapons.
Less than a month after his story ran in the newspaper, Barnett
was in court and was able to get a much better deal reflecting the fact
that his actions resulted from the effects of prescribed medication.379
Having spent over four years in prison already—which actually was the
amount of time reserved for the worst arson offenders under Georgia
law—he was immediately eligible for parole.380  Given that his de-
fense, if fully and zealously pursued, could have won him an acquittal,
one has to think that the reason he pled the second time was because
he had already served time and could be immediately released.
One might wonder how Barnett’s story is relevant to Rule 609.  It
is directly relevant because given that Barnett’s new plea was entered
as a “first offender,” under Georgia law, he will not have a criminal
record if he abides by the terms of his probation.381  Should he ever
be charged again after his record is expunged, the new plea will not
be used against him for Rule 609 purposes.  Had Barnett not
researched the law himself, he would likely still be in prison and
would have a lifelong record.  Now, he is out of prison and has the
opportunity to wipe his record clean.  Barnett blamed his four year
wait for a trial on Georgia’s poorly funded indigent defender pro-
gram, and he pled guilty for a second time, even as a jury was being
seated at his long-awaited new trial, simply hoping and praying to “be
home soon.”382
374. Simpson, supra note 368. R
375. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
379. Simpson, supra note 366. R
380. Id.
381. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
382. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Barnett’s case represents one problem: Many defendants are una-
ble to get an appropriate plea, particularly one that cannot later be
used in the Rule 609 context, due to injustices in the system.  The
Miami Herald conducted a study of nearly 800,000 cases to determine
whether there was unfairness based on race in the criminal process.383
The study revealed that white criminal defendants were more likely to
get a “withhold of adjudication,” which is a type of plea deal in which
there is an admission of guilt to a felony, but upon completion of the
terms of the deal, it will be wiped away from the person’s record.384
Indeed, the study found that “[w]hite criminal offenders in Florida
are nearly 50 percent more likely than blacks to get a withhold of
adjudication.”385  Disparities existed even when the conduct of black
and white defendants was almost “identical.”386
And then there are the cases that have not been written about.
The reality is that the number of cases that we know about in no way
reflects the enormity of the problem.  Norm Lefstein, who has chaired
the American Bar Association’s Indigent Defense Advisory Group, has
noted that the cases of which we are aware “likely are only the tip of
the iceberg” and that “[t]his is an enormous problem.”387
But not everyone sees the poor quality of indigent defense as a
problem.  Some members of the public are either apathetic or have
little sympathy for the poor in the criminal system.  For example, one
radio host, upset that his state legislature raised the pay for court-ap-
pointed lawyers to avoid a “crisis” in its indigent defender program,
reportedly said that “ ‘poor people eat crummy food, they live in
crummy houses and drive crummy cars, so why shouldn’t they have
crummy lawyers?’”388  Sadly, the criminal system seems to take this
view as well: “Whether they face serious felony charges or misdemean-
ors, the poor often find themselves alone in a sometimes-Kafkaesque
system where they have little, if any, voice.”389  Left alone in this sys-
383. Manny Garcia & Jason Grotto, Odds Favor Whites for Plea Deals, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
26, 2004, at 1A.
384. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
385. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
386. Id.
387. Kit R. Roane, When the Poor Go to Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 23, 2006, at
34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
388. Laura Parker, 8 Years in a Louisiana Jail, But He Never Went to Trial, USA TODAY, Aug.
29, 2005, at A1 (reporting the paraphrasing of a radio host by Tom Workman, president of
the Massachusetts Association of Court Appointed Attorneys).
389. Roane, supra note 387. R
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tem, many plead guilty just to be released from jail and have often
already spent months or even years in jail awaiting a trial.390
In December 2004, the American Bar Association’s Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants (“ABA Commit-
tee”) reported that “thousands of persons are processed through
America’s courts every year either with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer
who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases the inclina-
tion to provide effective representation.”391  Furthermore, the report
noted that defendants, even innocent defendants, “[a]ll too often”
enter guilty pleas even though they do not understand what they are
doing or what their rights are under the law.392  The report was the
“culmination of a painstaking analysis of hundreds of pages of testi-
mony” from experts on indigent defense services around the coun-
try.393  The report is said to have “accurately captured the widespread
difficulties in delivering adequate defense services for the poor” across
the country.394
Among the various problems that lead to constitutionally defi-
cient representation for poor defendants is the phenomenon of the
“meet ‘em and plead ‘em” attorney.395  This scenario occurs when the
public defender meets with her client for the first time on the day of
arraignment or on the day of trial, informs the client of the “deal” that
she has “negotiated” for the client, and tells the client to “sign
here.”396
In Quitman County, Mississippi, for example, a study of felony
cases processed in that county during a five year span revealed that
forty-two percent of the cases involving an indigent defender resulted
in guilty pleas entered into on the day of arraignment, which also hap-
pened to be the first time that the attorney had met with her client.397
According to a witness from Alabama, “contract defenders in that
state basically do nothing but process defendants to a guilty plea in as
expeditious a manner as possible.”398  Another witness from Georgia
reported that “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” was a “pretty prevalent prac-
390. This seems to be what Barnett did with his second plea rather than take his chances
at trial in a system that had failed him repeatedly. See supra text accompanying notes
379–80. R
391. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 361, at iv. R
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1.
394. Id. at iv.
395. Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
396. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
397. Id.
398. Id.
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tice throughout the state of Georgia.”399  Stephen Bright, Director of
the Southern Center for Human Rights, explained the morning rou-
tine in Crisp County, Georgia: “[C]all[ ] the arraignment calendar
and no one except people who have paid lawyers would have a lawyer.
Everyone else will be appointed a lawyer when his or her case is called.
By twelve noon everybody will have pled guilty and been sen-
tenced.”400  He went on to describe the afternoon court session in
Crisp County.  For that session, “court will convene at the jail.”401
There would be a contract lawyer present and criminal defendants
would be “paraded out and plead guilty and be sentenced.”402  The
judge would wait as lawyers negotiated pleas “in open court” and
“then the judge [would] come on the bench when everybody is ready
to plead guilty and move the calendar along.”403
As Mr. Bright saw it, this was not true legal representation, let
alone constitutionally sufficient legal representation.  He stated that
“[t]his is [just] processing” and therefore “[h]igh school students
could do this.”404  It is difficult to disagree with him on this point in
light of the substantial evidence supporting his statement.  One re-
porter stated the following: “Indigent attorneys can rarely use the
tools of investigation and expert witnesses which are standard fare for
paying customers.  The costs are prohibitive and many times unrecov-
erable.  It’s just enough to know their client’s name and to plea bar-
gain a sentence.  Guilt or innocence rarely enters the equation.”405
d. Judges’ Roles: Plea Bargaining Advocates?
In the criminal context, the judge’s involvement in the plea bar-
gaining process is of the utmost importance given its prevalent use in
disposing of cases.406  Although nationally there are norms that pur-
port to discourage judges from taking a participatory role in the plea
bargaining process, many judges engage in the process in order to
move cases along expeditiously.407  Indeed, many judges across the
country have been sending “[t]he undeniable message to defend-
399. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
400. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
401. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
402. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
403. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
404. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
405. One Roadblock Remains to Adequate Indigent Defense, MACON TELEGRAPH, Apr. 3, 2003,
at A10.
406. Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Process, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1361 (2004).
407. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1077 (2006).
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ants . . . that they will be punished for exercising the right guaranteed
to them by the Constitution.”408  One commentator has written that
“[t]o apply contract theory to a situation where an all-powerful judge
is negotiating with a powerless defendant about how long the judge
will send the defendant to prison for is inappropriate” given that
“[t]he process of negotiation generally implies and assumes relatively
comparable positions of power on each side.”409  The idea that a crim-
inal defendant will believe her position is in any way comparable to
that of a judge, who has the power to sentence her to prison, possibly
for her entire life depending on the charges, is almost risible.410
Reported cases, newspaper articles, and investigative reports are
replete with stories of judges who have used tactics that range from
questionable to completely reprehensible.411  Such tactics are all in
the name of facilitating the plea bargaining machine for the sake of
efficiency.412  In Ohio, for example, one judge told a defendant the
following: “ ‘You have a right to counsel in this case, but if you would like
to resolve the matter today you may waive that right and plead guilty.’”413
In Rhode Island, a judge told an unrepresented defendant that he
could plead guilty right then and receive a six month sentence, but
cautioned him that if he demanded an attorney he would likely be
sentenced to three years.414  A witness to those Rhode Island proceed-
ings even filed a disciplinary complaint against the judge.415  In addi-
tion, practically everyone in a courtroom pled guilty when a California
judge told a defendant the following: “If you plead guilty today, you’ll
go home.  If you want an attorney, you’ll stay in jail for two more days
and then your case will be set for trial and, if you can meet the bail
amount, you’ll be released.”416
One New York Supreme Court judge, determined to proceed
with his docket, appointed a lawyer who happened to be sitting in the
courtroom to represent a defendant charged with burglary.417  Once
408. Id. at 1078.
409. Klein, supra note 406, at 1356 (footnote call number omitted). R
410. Id.
411. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 407, at 1077 (describing a New York judge R
who used a “combination of exorbitant bail and a taste of jail to coerce defendants into
pleading guilty”).
412. Id.
413. Id. at 1075 (emphasis added) (quoting THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN OHIO 50 (1991)).
414. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 361, at 25. R
415. Id.
416. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
417. Sam Roberts, For One Zealous Judge, Hard Bargaining Pushes Cases Through the Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1985, at B1.
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the “appointed” attorney approached the bench with the attorney’s
new “client,” the judge informed them of the specific plea offer and
explained that it was good just for that day and would become pro-
gressively less attractive each subsequent day.418  For judges like this
one, having an attorney is a “mere legal formality, a precondition for
the court’s efforts to obtain the desired plea.”419  The idea is “to co-
opt the attorney, to have the lawyer act as a mere assistant in the rap-
idly-moving assembly line, and in doing so to redefine the role of
counsel so that the whole process would have the appearance of legiti-
macy.”420  Other judges may not be as crude as the New York Supreme
Court judge, but the effect is essentially the same.
According to the ABA Committee, stories like these demonstrate
“how innocent defendants without legal knowledge or the assistance
of counsel easily can be coerced by judges or prosecutors into believ-
ing they will receive jail time unless they plead guilty.”421  Moreover,
“aside from an obvious risk of wrongful conviction, uncounseled guilty
pleas are also deeply troubling in light of the potentially harsh, collat-
eral consequences of criminal convictions.”422  These collateral conse-
quences can include deportation and the loss of the right to vote,423 as
well as difficulty finding employment.424  Furthermore, contrived re-
cidivism, the alarming problem that this Article seeks to address, is
another reality for the defendants.  These people will in all likelihood
find themselves at odds with the criminal justice system again, and
their prior records will be used against them.425
Still we have judges who, instead of vigorously protecting defend-
ants’ rights in the plea bargaining setting, actually act as advocates for
the prosecution or even purport that they are acting in the best inter-
est of the defendant.  In the Wisconsin case State v. Williams,426 for
example, the defendant sought on appeal to withdraw his guilty plea
418. See id. (quoting the judge saying that “‘[a]fter today, it’s 3 to 6, after that, it’s 4 to
8’” and that “‘if they’re ever going to plead, today is the time to do it’”).
419. Klein, supra note 406, at 1364. R
420. Id.
421. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 361, at 25. R
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the
Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1338 & n.160 (2004)
(“Most job applications ask whether the applicant has ever been convicted of a felony, and
most employers will not knowingly hire people who have a criminal record.”).
425. See id. at 1338 (“Being a former felon forges a persons’ [sic] identity—if by nothing
else, than by mere force of circumstance and treatment by those on the outside.”).
426. 666 N.W.2d 58 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
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for drug possession with intent to deliver.427  Williams argued on ap-
peal that the judge in the trial court coerced and pressured him into
pleading guilty.428  Indeed, the judge had done just that.  On the
morning of trial, the court had Williams and his attorney as well as the
prosecutor come to his chambers for a “little chat.”429  After this “little
chat,” Williams pled guilty in exchange for an amended charge that
effectively reduced the penalty range for the conviction.430  Though
the conversation in chambers was not recorded,431 the judge at-
tempted to “recreate” the conversation for the record and openly ac-
knowledged his “understanding that to some extent it’s not
appropriate for Courts to get involved in the plea bargaining.”432  In-
credibly, the judge then accepted Williams’s guilty plea as “freely, vol-
untarily and intelligently entered.”433  Williams asked the trial court to
withdraw his guilty plea when, according to him, he was not sentenced
in accordance with the judge’s promise of one to three years.434  In-
stead, he received a total of five years imprisonment and five years
supervised release.435  Williams’s conversation with the judge illus-
trates the unequal bargaining power between the defendant and a
judge.  Williams relayed to the court the following:
I had no intentions of pleading guilty, but by my being
young and inexperienced, being ignorant of the law, you in-
vited me into [your] chambers, you influenced me and pres-
sured me into giving a guilty plea.  As you said, if I was to lose
trial, it is a good chance I would receive a seven to ten year
sentence.
Your Honor, since I originally turned down a plea bar-
gain in the hallway, I can honestly say if you wouldn’t have
taken me in your chambers, I wouldn’t have never pled
guilty.  Myself being in a powerful judge’s chambers, you
eroded my ability to make a decision of my own.436
The judge refused to withdraw the plea, stating the following to
Williams: “You feel you’ve been railroaded.  You feel you didn’t get
your trial. . . .  But at this point in time the record does not support
427. Id. at 59.
428. Id. at 60.
429. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
430. Id. at 61.
431. Id. at 60.
432. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
433. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 62 (alteration in original).
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me allowing you to withdraw the plea because at the time it appeared
in all respects that this was a free and voluntary thing.”437  Adopting a
“bright-line rule” that any judicial participation in plea negotiation
raises a presumption of the involuntariness of the conviction, the
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin overturned Williams’s conviction.438
Unfortunately, Williams’s case is not an isolated example of judi-
cial advocacy in plea bargaining.  In United States v. Bradley,439 the
Fourth Circuit threw out several defendants’ guilty pleas because of
the trial judge’s improper influence over the negotiations.440  During
the course of the trial, which was originally expected to take five to six
weeks, the court made various coercive comments to the defendants
to attempt to persuade them to accept the government’s plea deal.441
At one point the judge told one of the defendants, “ ‘I don’t know
what it was that caused that plea to break down.  It was a wonderful
offer.  It was an incredible offer.’”442  At the end of a three hour re-
cess, when the prosecution told the court that there was still no plea
agreement and one of the defense attorneys stated that it was because
of the offered sentence, the court “expressed puzzlement that the rec-
ommended sentence in the plea agreement presented a stumbling
block because the court . . . was not bound by the sentence set forth in
a plea agreement.”443
At one point, the court “expressed sadness that the Defendants
had not taken advantage of the ‘very, very favorable . . . even . . .
extraordinarily favorable, plea offers that have been made.’”444  An-
other time, the court said the following about two defendants’ refusal
to plead guilty: “ ‘That really just absolutely boggles my mind.  It abso-
lutely boggles my mind . . . .  It’s really sad.’”445  While acknowledging
that “‘nobody can ever predict what a jury is going to do,’” the court
still pressed upon the defendants that “ ‘this is one of the strongest
cases ever to be brought in this courthouse.’”446  The trial court fur-
ther explained to the defendants as follows:
[T]he unfortunates who get involved in the drug trade come
to recognize eventually . . . that there is benefit in not push-
437. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
438. Id. at 67.
439. 455 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2006).
440. Id. at 455.
441. Id. at 456–59.
442. Id. at 457–58.
443. Id. at 458.
444. Id.
445. Id. (alteration in original).
446. Id.
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ing the government to actually do what the government is
prepared in every case to do, and that is to marshal evidence
to produce against the defendants who are indicted, . . . to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.447
One of the defendants rightly objected to the trial judge’s pres-
sure and the way he was “judging” them: “‘You keep telling us to cop
out, like we are already guilty.’”448  Shortly thereafter, one of the de-
fendants attempted to plead guilty, but the court refused to accept his
guilty plea unless his co-defendants pled guilty as well.449  Finally, after
more facilitation from the court, all defendants entered guilty
pleas.450  Their sentences ranged from twenty-four-and-one-half years
to life in prison.451
The Fourth Circuit found plain error in the extensive participa-
tion by the trial judge in the plea negotiations.452  Refusing to find
plain error, according to the appellate court, “would seriously affect
the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings.”453  The court further noted that “[t]he district court repeatedly
appeared to be an advocate for the pleas rather than . . . as a neutral
arbiter.”454  The appellate court rightly refused to ignore the “re-
peated judicial intervention” in the plea bargaining process: “The fact
is, the jury rendered no verdict in this case; there has been no ‘fair
and reliable determination’ of the Defendants’ guilt.”455
These reported cases are troubling in and of themselves.  While I
applaud the Fourth Circuit’s decision, it will not be often that a plea
agreement is overturned (or frankly even appealed in the first place).
Indeed, it is troubling that there are cases that we will never hear
about.  The reported cases demonstrate just how easily judges can be
tempted to, and will, improperly exert influence over defendants and
coerce them into plea deals, even while on the record and acknowl-
edging that their behavior is inappropriate.  There is great potential
for judicial coercion inherent in the process to begin with because the
“‘unequal positions of the judge and the accused, one with the power
to commit to prison and the other deeply concerned to avoid prison,
447. Id. at 458–59 (third alteration in original).
448. Id. at 459.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. See id. (providing the specific lengths of their sentences).
452. Id. at 464.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
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at once raise a question of fundamental fairness.’”456  The problem
inherent in the considerably unequal positions of the judge and crimi-
nal defendant is substantially magnified when the judge makes any
indication at all that she wishes for the defendant to plead guilty.457  A
defendant would quite reasonably expect that if she does not go along
with the judge’s wishes that she will receive a longer sentence should
she go to trial, as well as unfair and biased treatment from the
judge.458
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure unequivo-
cally prohibits judges from engaging in or participating in plea negoti-
ations.459  Specifically, the Rule provides the following: “An attorney
for the government and the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant
when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea agreement.
The court must not participate in these discussions.”460  The purpose
of the Rule is to prevent judges from coercing defendants into guilty
pleas and from appearing as an advocate as opposed to a “neutral
arbiter.”461  Courts have recognized that pleas obtained by coercion
are a violation of a defendant’s fundamental rights under the
Constitution.462
In United States v. Rodriguez,463 a judge pressured a defendant into
accepting a guilty plea.464  When the defendant stated that he wanted
to go to trial, she asked if he was sure about that, and told him that he
456. Id. at 465 (quoting United States v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193, 194 (6th Cir. 1992)).
457. See id. (“‘When a judge becomes a participant in plea bargaining he brings to bear
the full force and majesty of his office.  His awesome power to impose a substantially longer
or even maximum sentence in excess of that proposed is present whether referred to or
not.’” (quoting Barrett, 982 F.2d at 194)).
458. See id. at 460 (“‘The defendant may fear that rejection of the plea will mean imposi-
tion of a more severe sentence after trial or decrease his chances of obtaining a fair trial
before a judge whom he has challenged.’” (quoting United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198,
202 (2d Cir. 1976))).
459. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in [plea]
discussions.”).
460. Id.
461. Bradley, 455 F.3d at 460 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Markin, 263 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[A] judge’s participation in
plea negotiation is inherently coercive . . . .”); United States v. Rodriguez, 197 F.3d 156,
159 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he judge’s participation creates a misleading impression of his
role in the proceedings.  The judge’s role seems more like an advocate for the agreement
than a neutral arbiter if he joins the negotiations.” (internal quotation marks and footnote
call number omitted)).
462. Bradley, 455 F.3d at 460 (citing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (per
curiam)).
463. 197 F.3d 156.
464. Id. at 159.
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was likely to be found guilty if he did.465  The Fifth Circuit found im-
proper coercion in violation of Rule 11 on the part of the judge: “Any
of these statements would have been sufficient to put pressure on
Rodriguez.  Even absent these statements there was other pressure
present because pressure is inherent in any involvement by a judge in
the plea negotiation process.”466
While the law has recognized the substantial damage to the crimi-
nal defendant’s rights when a judge gets involved in plea bargaining
negotiations, the stories discussed above, and even in the reported
cases in which appellate courts rebuked the trial judges’ actions, show
how easily judges who are caught up in the day-to-day business of mov-
ing along their dockets can violate defendants’ rights and diminish
the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.  A judge even openly
acknowledged that racial biases may influence a judge trying to stay
afloat in managing a very large docket: “There’s great pressure to say:
‘Look, we have time for X cases today, and the calendar has X plus
200.  We’re going to have to hurry.  Go out and deal . . . .  In that
process, it is certainly possible that preconceived notions and miscon-
ceptions and stereotypes can creep in.’”467
3. The Innocence Problem
I would be remiss in not discussing the most troubling aspect of
the criminal justice system in general and the plea bargaining regime
in particular—the innocence problem.  The innocence problem gets
to the heart of many scholars’ and other commentators’ concerns with
the fairness of the criminal process, particularly as it relates to plea
bargaining.468  As Professor Bibas bluntly stated, “It should go without
saying that it is wrong to convict innocent defendants.  Thus, the law
should hinder these convictions instead of facilitating them . . . .”469
But there is a real and legitimate fear that the plea bargaining ma-
chine, in many areas across the country, has sacrificed accuracy so
much so that innocent people are being coerced into pleading guilty.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Christopher H. Schmitt, Plea Bargaining Favors Whites as Blacks, Hispanics Pay Price,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 8, 1991, at A1 (quoting Alameda County, California Supe-
rior Court Judge Ken Kawaichi).
468. See Russell, supra note 4, at 1226 (“The extraordinary impact of the innocence R
movement lies in the compelling simplicity of its theoretical underpinnings: If innocent
people have been and continue to be incarcerated and even executed, upon what claims of
legitimacy does our criminal justice system rely?”).
469. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure:
The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1382 (2003).
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Indeed, the innocence movement has uncovered the most disturbing
and uncomfortable aspect of our criminal justice system: Many—in-
deed, far too many—innocent defendants have been wrongfully
convicted.470
There is no way to know just how many defendants have been
convicted of crimes that they did not commit; at least one study has
estimated that annually, as many as 10,000 cases involving serious fel-
ony charges result in wrongful convictions.471  According to the Inno-
cence Project’s website, “[i]n about 25% of DNA exoneration cases,
innocent defendants made incriminating statements, delivered out-
right confessions or pled guilty.”472  The website notes that a study of
cases in which DNA exonerated convicted persons reveals that
“[i]nnocent defendants are convicted or plead guilty in this country
with less than adequate defense representation.”473
But the “known innocence cases represent the tip of an ice-
berg.”474  Indeed, “known exonerees remain only a subset of innocent
convicts; many cases do not or cannot receive DNA testing.”475  Profes-
sor Brandon Garrett has conducted an interesting examination of the
iceberg’s tip.  He discusses reasons for wrongful convictions in his
study of 200 cases, in which nearly all of the inmates were convicted of
either rape, murder, or both and were exonerated through innocence
projects relying on DNA testing.476  Of those 200, nine of the defend-
ants had actually pled guilty.477  At first blush, this may not raise cause
for concern with the plea bargaining system’s conviction of innocent
persons.478  But as Professor Garrett notes, these exonerees “do not
reflect the typical criminal convicts in that very few suspects are
charged with rape or murder and even fewer are convicted”; indeed,
“[a]ccording to the Bureau of Justice Statistics . . . only 0.7% of felony
470. See infra notes 471–79 and accompanying text. R
471. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 361, at 3. R
472. The Innocence Project, Understanding the Causes: False Confessions, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
473. The Innocence Project, Understanding the Causes: Bad Lawyering, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/understand/Bad-Lawyering.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
474. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62 (2008).
475. Id.
476. See id. at 64–74 (providing the relevant discussion).
477. Id. at 74.
478. See, e.g., Colin Starger, Death and Harmless Error: A Rhetorical Response to Judging Inno-
cence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 1 (2008), http://www.columbialawreview.org/arti-
cles/death-and-harmless-error-a-rhetorical-response-to-judging-innocence (“While critics
of contemporary criminal justice policies will likely see Professor Garrett’s data as revealing
the tip of an iceberg of deeper structural flaws, defenders of the status quo will predictably
resist generalizations from this closed data set to any larger picture of criminal justice
administration.”).
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defendants are convicted of murder and only 0.8% are convicted of
rape.”479  Rape and murder are some of the most serious crimes with
which defendants can be charged, and the prosecutors may simply not
have offered plea deals at all or may have offered deals that were not
attractive.  Also, these are just the cases that Professor Garrett knew
about at the time of his article—those in which the defendants had
been successful at obtaining post-conviction DNA testing.  Many more
convicted persons are attempting to get such testing or have failed to
secure it for various reasons, including lost evidence.
But just suppose that there were 1000 cases of rape and murder
where defendants were wrongfully convicted, and around four per-
cent pled guilty—that would be forty people having actually pled
guilty to one of the most serious criminal offenses in this country.
Moreover, what about the less serious offenses that nevertheless carry
serious prison time?  More importantly, what about those crimes in
which DNA is not even an issue?  Many wrongly convicted defendants
may never be able to prove their innocence, and these troubling ques-
tions reveal just why some people reasonably believe that the inno-
cence movement has only uncovered the “tip of an iceberg.”480
We have no real way of knowing just how many innocent defend-
ants have served prison time or are serving prison time right now for
crimes that they did not commit, and of those, how many actually pled
guilty.  Whatever the number truly is, whether it is 10,000 or 10, we
should not be satisfied with a system that would convict anyone who is
innocent.481  Furthermore, we should never be satisfied with a system
that actually coerces people to plead guilty.482  While it may be unreal-
istic to expect that there will ever be a perfect system, we must con-
stantly and vigilantly seek to perfect the system’s accuracy.  We should,
despite Justice Scalia’s deep skepticism during oral arguments in
United States v. Ruiz,483 be “horrified” with the coercive plea bargaining
practices used against innocent defendants.484
479. Garrett, supra note 474, at 74 (citation omitted). R
480. See id. at 62 (arguing that “known innocence cases represent the tip of an iceberg”).
481. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 26 (revealing that Justice R
Scalia would be “horrified” if our criminal justice system encouraged innocent people to
plead guilty).
482. See supra Part III.A.2.
483. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
484. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81. R
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Innocent defendants do plead guilty because of inherently coer-
cive plea bargaining practices.485  Indeed, the law formally recognizes
and accepts that an innocent defendant can plead guilty.486  The Su-
preme Court has approved of what are known as Alford pleas, through
which a defendant enters a guilty plea while at the same time main-
taining her innocence.487  Specifically, the Court in North Carolina v.
Alford488 stated as follows:
[W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial
and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a
constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty.
An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly,
and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his partic-
ipation in the acts constituting the crime.489
In Alford, the Court found no constitutional error in the trial
court’s acceptance of the defendant’s plea and stated that it was
“reasonabl[e]” for the defendant to have entered the guilty plea be-
cause it thereby “limited the maximum penalty” that would be im-
posed upon him.490
Justice Scalia’s comment that “[t]here is nothing in our system
that encourages or even allows an innocent person . . . to plead
guilty”491 indicates that he would not agree with the system’s use of
Alford pleas.  Moreover, presumably, he would certainly not agree with
the criminal process—occurring daily across this country—whereby
efficiency is the primary concern and innocence is often simply not an
issue.492
485. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 231
(2007) (noting that “bargaining leverage leads to plea bargains inappropriately replacing
trials and may play a role in wrongful convictions”); see also supra Part III.A.2.
486. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29, 39 (1970) (holding that the Fourth
Circuit erred in finding a defendant’s plea of guilty, made when the defendant had denied
guilt, constitutionally invalid).
487. See id. at 37–39 (recognizing a defendant who pleads guilty while maintaining inno-
cence may be criminally punished without violating the U.S. Constitution).
488. 400 U.S. 25.
489. Id. at 37.
490. Id.
491. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 26. R
492. See infra Part III.B.
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B. Is Rule 609’s Promotion of Plea Bargaining Worthy of the Sacrifice
in Evidentiary Quality?
Rule 609 promotes plea bargaining by actually facilitating pleas,
as discussed above, and by legitimizing the system in giving substantial
evidentiary power to untried convictions.493  Even though in theory
Rule 609 only permits impeachment of criminal defendants, the real-
ity is that prior convictions are used as substantive evidence of guilt.494
I have offered above a discussion of major flaws in the plea bargaining
system to lay the foundation for addressing the larger policy question
of whether the rules of evidence should promote this system.
As I previously mentioned in the brief discussion of Federal Rule
of Evidence 410,495 a specialized relevance rule,496 there are several
instances in which the evidentiary rules promote certain social poli-
cies.497  Of course, Rule 410 itself promotes plea bargaining.498  Addi-
tionally, Rule 411 excludes evidence regarding liability insurance as
proof of negligence.499  The policy behind Rule 411 is to discourage
jurors from deciding the case on “improper grounds”; moreover, lia-
bility insurance or the lack thereof has little, if any, probative value in
determining liability issues, such as whether someone was negligent or
not.500  Rule 407 excludes the use of subsequent remedial measures to
prove liability.501  By insulating parties from liability, Rule 407 encour-
ages parties to implement remedial measures.502  At the same time,
the Rule also recognizes that the actions that one takes subsequent to
an incident generally have little probative value in the apportionment
of liability for that incident.503
The rules that come under the rubric of the “Rape Shield” law
advance social policies as well.504  These evidentiary rules generally ex-
493. See supra Part II.B.
494. See supra text accompanying notes 159–63. R
495. See supra notes 114–25 and accompanying text. R
496. See FED. R. EVID. 410 & advisory committee’s note (excluding certain evidence re-
garding plea bargaining as a matter of social policy).
497. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. R
498. See infra Part III.B.1.
499. FED. R. EVID. 411.
500. FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee’s note.
501. FED. R. EVID. 407.
502. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note.
503. See id. (characterizing the probative value of subsequent remedial measures as weak
by noting that “[t]he conduct is not in fact an admission, since the conduct is equally
consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence”).
504. See FED. R. EVID. 412–415 (dealing with sex offense, sexual assault, and child moles-
tation cases).
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clude evidence of a victim’s sexual history or predisposition.505  The
underlying policy shields victims from having to confront embarrass-
ing evidence or to endure harassing lines of questioning regarding
their sexual histories.506  These evidentiary protections encourage vic-
tims to report sexual offenses.507  Moreover, they assist the fact-finding
process by keeping irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence from
the jury.508  Indeed, the common thread that connects the “social pol-
icy” evidentiary rules is that each rule promotes its respective policy
while simultaneously enhancing the truth-seeking process.
In contrast, rules that promote and legitimize plea bargaining,
such as Rules 410 and 609, impede the truth-seeking process.  Con-
sider how prosecutors have manipulated Rule 410 to force defendants
to accept plea bargains.509
1. Lessons from Prosecutors’ Use of Rule 410
In practice, defendants rarely invoke Rule 410 at trial because
prosecutors routinely coerce defendants into waiving their rights
under this Rule before they will even offer a plea deal.510  In United
States v. Mezzanatto,511 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of plea-statement rule waivers.512  Faced with an argument that such
waivers would impede the plea bargaining process, the Court instead
found that waivers could also encourage plea bargaining.513  The Court
reasoned that prosecutors, unable to secure waivers, might never initi-
ate negotiation talks.514  Rather than disrupting the plea bargaining
process, the Court found that waivers could facilitate the process.515
The Court’s analysis in Mezzanatto, finding that Rule 410 waivers
facilitate plea bargains, comports with the reality of the plea system in
505. See FED. R. EVID. 412 (generally prohibiting the admission of evidence of the vic-
tim’s “other sexual behavior” and “sexual disposition”).
506. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. See infra Part III.B.1.
510. See infra note 516 and accompanying text. R
511. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
512. Id. at 210 (“We hold that absent some affirmative indication that the agreement
was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary
provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable.”).
513. Id. at 207–08.
514. Id.  The Court noted that prosecutors might refuse to plea bargain without such
waivers, particularly early on in criminal cases when prosecutors are still gathering evi-
dence and building a case. Id. at 207.  At that point, a suspect might be willing to provide
such evidence and information regarding other suspects in exchange for leniency and im-
munity. Id.
515. Id. at 208.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 70 28-MAY-10 13:44
570 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:501
that plea-statement waivers of Rule 410 protections are quite rou-
tine.516  Ironically, Rule 410’s policy of promoting plea bargaining is
carried out when defendants waive the evidentiary protections embod-
ied in the Rule.  Of course, prosecutors do not use Rule 410 waivers
solely to facilitate initiation of plea deals.  Rather, they routinely in-
voke Rule 410 to discourage defendants who receive higher-than-ex-
pected sentences from backing out of plea deals.517  Theoretically,
such waivers must be executed “knowing[ly], voluntar[ily] and compe-
tent[ly],”518 but the reality of plea bargain negotiations calls into ques-
tion whether the waiver requirements are being met on a routine
basis.
Even so, Rule 410 waivers promote the plea bargaining regime by
discouraging defendants from reneging on plea deals because they
have waived the evidentiary protections that otherwise prohibit the
prosecutor from introducing adverse statements, offered during the
plea negotiations, at trial.519  Moreover, waivers promote the plea bar-
gaining regime by vesting even more coercive power in the
prosecutor.
The way in which prosecutors have subverted and manipulated
Rule 410 to gain even more leverage in the plea bargaining process is
quite troubling.  While it is true that Rule 410 was intended to facili-
tate plea bargaining, it was to do so in a way that protected criminal
defendants because it gave them the freedom to engage in candid
negotiations with the government without the fear that their state-
ments might later be used against them.520  The Rule, as intended,
protected defendants while at the same time promoting plea bargain-
ing.  The Rule, as intended, also promoted the goals of truth-seeking
and accuracy in the plea bargaining process by encouraging defend-
ants to speak candidly with prosecutors.521
By allowing waivers of Rule 410’s protections, the judiciary privi-
leged plea bargaining with no concern at all for protecting the defen-
dant from coercion.  The practical misuse of Rule 410 illustrates what
516. See United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1396 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Plea agreements,
for example, commonly contain a provision stating that proffer information that is disclosed
during the course of plea negotiations is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt, but
is admissible for purposes of impeachment.” (emphasis added)).
517. See Hall, supra note 121, at 601–02 (“[A] waiver of her rights under Rule 410 . . . R
effectively prevents a defendant from ever withdrawing her plea since the government
would be able to introduce all admissions of guilt made during the plea hearing.”).
518. Id.
519. See supra note 517. R
520. See Rasmusen, supra note 119, at 1550. R
521. FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee’s note.
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can happen when the rules of evidence are used to advance judicial
efficiency at the expense of accuracy and truth-seeking.  The rules
simply become another means by which prosecutors and judges co-
erce defendants into accepting pleas.  To insulate defendants from
coercion and to restore the truth-seeking function of the judiciary, we
must disentangle the dysfunctional relationship between plea bargain-
ing and the evidence rules.
2. Conducting a Cost-Benefit Analysis
Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that “[t]hese
rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”522  Indeed, even
before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme
Court observed that “[r]ules of evidence are designed in the interest
of fair trials.”523  Long before making that assertion, the Court ex-
plained, “The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence
must rest—if they are to rest upon reason—is their adaptation to the
successful development of the truth.”524  To be sure, Rule 102 ad-
dresses both efficiency (hence the concern for “elimination of unjusti-
fiable expense and delay”) as well as the overarching goals of fairness,
justice, and the ascertainment of truth.525
How, then, does the use of prior untried convictions to impeach
fit in with the goals of the evidentiary rules?  Is the purported effi-
ciency achieved through promoting and legitimizing plea bargaining
at the expense of the goals of accuracy and truth-seeking?  Or is the
system maximizing its ability to achieve both efficiency and accuracy?
To answer these questions, a cost-benefit analysis that examines un-
tried convictions admissible under Rule 609 is appropriate.
Judge Posner considered Rule 609 in a law review article that ap-
plied economic theory to evidence law.526  He made the following
conclusion: “On balance, there is probably no benefit in enhanced
522. FED. R. EVID. 102; see also Okun, supra note 314, at 533 (noting that it is “axio- R
matic . . . that the primary purpose of a trial is to discover the truth”).
523. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 352 (1969).
524. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
525. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in adminis-
tration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and de-
velopment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.”).
526. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1526–27 (1999) (discussing Rule 609).
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accuracy to allowing the use of prior-crimes evidence in cross-exami-
nation.  But there is a cost—the same cost as the cost of allowing
prior-crimes evidence to be used to prove a criminal propensity.”527
As have other scholars and judges criticizing Rule 609, Judge Posner
acknowledged that “[d]espite the limiting instruction to which the de-
fendant is entitled, the jury cannot be expected to confine its consid-
eration of prior-crimes evidence to the issue of the defendant’s
credibility.”528  He noted that it is “doubtful” that someone who has
“flouted the criminal law in the past” is “more unlikely to take his oath
seriously than a first-time offender who thinks he can lie his way to an
acquittal.”529  Moreover, “[t]here is no basis for supposing that recidi-
vists are more likely than first-time offenders to lie; both are criminals,
and the incentive of a criminal to lie is unrelated to whether he has
committed one crime or more than one.”530  Posner posits that Rule
609 is antithetical to the criminal law’s goal of deterrence:
Rule 609 thus undermines the deterrence of habitual offend-
ers by reducing the probability that a habitual offender who
testifies will be acquitted, thereby deterring habitual offend-
ers from testifying.  The jury is apt to infer guilt from the
defendant’s failing to testify (and this, once again, regardless
of any limiting instructions).531
Posner’s theory properly acknowledges that persons with prior
records know, perhaps better than anyone else, that they are targets of
law enforcement and that they will be rounded up as “the usual sus-
pects” in criminal investigations.532  Judge Posner even observed that
rules like Rule 609, which parade defendants’ prior convictions before
the jury, encourage prosecutors to go after persons with criminal
records: “Prosecutors would find it so much easier to convict habitual
offenders, guilty or not, that their incentives to prosecute first-time of-
fenders would be impaired (assuming that prosecutors operate with a
budget constraint and . . . want to maximize convictions weighted by
length of sentence, subject to that constraint).”533  Knowing that their
criminal records will be used against them as presumptions of guilt,
those with such records will have little incentive to avoid future crimi-
527. Id. at 1527.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 1526–27.
530. Id. at 1527.
531. Id.
532. See Ellmann, supra note 186, at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing R
the police’s practice of rounding up “the usual suspects” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
533. See Posner, supra note 526, at 1526 (emphasis added). R
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nal behavior.  From this perspective, Judge Posner is correct that Rule
609 undermines deterrence.
Judge Posner’s analysis can be applied in the plea bargaining con-
text as well.  Indeed, the problems that he described with respect to
the trial setting are magnified in the plea bargaining setting.  Further-
more, because the plea bargaining system supplies the vast majority of
convictions, it is in the context of plea bargaining that Rule 609 has
the greatest impact.534  Prosecutors are more likely to obtain plea bar-
gains from alleged recidivists regardless of the strength of the case,
knowing that they will have little chance of acquittal.535
Thus, promoting and legitimizing plea bargaining through Rule
609 promotes a fundamentally flawed system that effectively creates
recidivism at the expense of going after many first-time offenders.
Moreover, Rule 609 sacrifices accuracy in results.  While efficiency is
no doubt valuable in the criminal justice system, it is certainly not, or
at least it should not be, what the system values the most.536  Where
these two goals are at odds, efficiency must give way to accuracy, and
certainly accuracy must not be sacrificed for the sake of efficiency.  In
short, efficiency in the criminal justice system has little value unless
the system is accurate.
IV. ADDRESSING THE FUNDAMENTAL (UN)FAIRNESS OF USING PLEA
BARGAINS TO IMPEACH AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In this Part, I offer both legislative and judicial proposals for deal-
ing with the fundamental unfairness of using prior convictions ob-
tained through the deeply flawed plea bargaining system.  First, I
address the constitutional problem associated with using such convic-
tions.  I establish that, if due process permits prior conviction im-
peachment at all, it must only permit the admissibility of reliable prior
convictions against criminal defendants, and that the current system
of plea bargaining in many jurisdictions across the country falls well
short of providing such reliability.537  I then propose that Congress
and state legislatures that have adopted Rule 609 address the due pro-
cess issue.538  Alternatively, unless and until Congress acts, I offer sug-
gestions for those judges who are interested in addressing the
534. See supra Part II.
535. See Dodson, supra note 148, at 39, 41 n.421 (discussing research suggesting that R
defendants with criminal records are more likely to be convicted than those with clean
records).
536. Bibas, supra note 469, at 1382. R
537. See infra Part IV.A.
538. See infra Part IV.A.
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fundamental fairness concerns that I have raised with respect to the
use of untried convictions under Rule 609.539  My proposals here com-
plement and expand on previous guidelines that I have offered in sug-
gesting that judges expressly consider defendants’ race and racial
biases in the criminal process when assessing the reliability of prior
convictions.540
A. Proposal for Legislative Action
Scholarly criticism of Rule 609 is appropriate given the Rule’s
faulty underlying premise and the grave potential for prejudice to
criminal defendants.  Ideally, Congress and state legislatures that have
adopted Rule 609 should exclude the Rule’s applicability to criminal
defendants altogether in order to eliminate the unfair prejudice to
defendants resulting from using their prior convictions to impeach
them.  The problems inherent in using untried convictions under
Rule 609 that I have raised in this Article provide additional, and I
would argue even more compelling, reasons for the elimination of the
Rule altogether, at least with respect to criminal defendants.541  More-
over, my criticism of the use of untried convictions in particular goes
beyond the usual critique of Rule 609 by looking to the realities of
today’s criminal process, which relies heavily upon the plea bargain-
ing regime—a regime that often cares very little about whether, and
does little in practice to ensure that, individual defendants actually
committed the crimes with which they are charged and ultimately
convicted.542
This reality is at odds with Rule 609’s underlying premise that all
felonious behavior, as well as criminally deceptive behavior, renders a
criminal defendant less credible.543  The use of convictions from the
plea bargaining system, plagued by the flaws I discussed above, is
wholly inconsistent with Rule 609’s premise.  If the Rule is to remain a
part of evidence law—and to be clear, I believe that it should not—it
should at least recognize the reality of plea bargaining; it should also
recognize that the trial setting, though it may not be perfect, is still a
far better source for Rule 609 evidence, particularly as used against a
criminal defendant.544  I am far less concerned about the use of such
539. See infra Part IV.B.
540. See Carodine, supra note 65, at 586–87 (providing greater detail regarding this pre- R
vious proposal).
541. See supra Part III.
542. See supra Part III.
543. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. R
544. See supra Part III.A for a comparison between tried and untried convictions.
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evidence against ordinary witnesses for the prosecution, because I see
no problem with a criminal defendant using the government’s unreli-
able convictions against its own witnesses.
The due process problem has been raised with respect to the use
of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants—even without a
specific focus on untried convictions.  For example, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, which has adopted a rule prohibiting impeachment
of a criminal defendant with his prior convictions, found that the
prior conviction impeachment rule unreasonably burdens a criminal
defendant’s right to testify and thus violates due process.545  The court
explained, “While technically the defendant with prior convictions
may still be free to testify, the admission of prior convictions to im-
peach credibility ‘is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a con-
stitutional privilege.’”546  The burden might be outweighed,
according to the court, “if there were some value” in using prior con-
victions to impeach criminal defendants.547  But it was “apparent” to
the court that “prior convictions are of little real assistance to the jury
in its determination of whether defendant’s testimony as a witness is
credible.”548  The court was not even persuaded that crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement were of much value: “Even if the crime
involves dishonesty or false statements, in light of the fact that every
criminal defendant may be under great pressure to lie, the slight ad-
ded relevance which even a perjury conviction may carry would not
seem to justify its admission.”549  Additionally, the court noted that
juries are “presumably qualified to determine whether or not a witness
is lying from his demeanor and his reaction to probing cross-
examination.”550
As the Hawaii Supreme Court observed, the prior conviction im-
peachment rule admits marginally relevant evidence against a defen-
dant.  I argue that the already low probative value of such evidence is
diminished further when the convictions were bargained for, and the
prejudice to the criminal defendant is magnified by the use of such
unreliable convictions.
Realistically, I recognize that Rule 609 is a deeply entrenched evi-
dentiary rule and that Congress and most state legislatures will likely
be reticent to eliminate it altogether.  There does seem to be increas-
545. State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (Haw. 1971).
546. Id. at 660 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
547. Id. at 661.
548. Id.
549. Id. (emphasis added).
550. Id.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 76 28-MAY-10 13:44
576 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:501
ing concern, however, about the accuracy of the criminal justice sys-
tem, particularly in light of the important work that the Innocence
Project and others have done in heightening awareness about our sys-
tem’s deep flaws.551  As the previously referenced ABA Committee ob-
serves, some lawmakers are particularly concerned about the delivery
of competent legal counsel to indigent defendants, and are poised to
implement significant reforms (or have already begun doing so).552
To the extent that Congress and state legislatures wish to pro-
mote overall fairness in the criminal justice system and in the plea
bargaining process in particular, they must align the rules of criminal
procedure, criminal statutes, and, of course, the rules of evidence with
those goals.  The time to address the fundamental unfairness of Rule
609 is long overdue.  It is particularly crucial given that the plea bar-
gaining system has shown itself as a whole to be inferior to the trial
process—in many instances, woefully inferior.553  If we are to have a
prior conviction impeachment rule against defendants at all, untried
convictions should not be used in subsequent proceedings to impeach
(and effectively reconvict) criminal defendants.  Congress and state
legislatures should use the evidentiary rules as a part of an overall ef-
fort to achieve fairness and accuracy in plea bargaining, not merely as
a means by which to promote an efficient, yet deficient, system.
Lawmakers should remove plea bargains from Rule 609’s applicability.
Alternatively, lawmakers should recognize that the vast plea bar-
gaining machine that has almost entirely displaced the criminal pro-
cess severely undercuts Rule 609’s legitimacy to the extent that the
Rule itself should be eliminated entirely.  Either approach would
rightly delegitimize the flawed plea bargaining regime.  Rule 609, as it
currently stands, legitimizes a broken system and goes further by actu-
ally reproducing its failings in subsequent proceedings.554  Unless we
can be certain that plea bargaining is equal in reliability to trials and
that it affords criminal defendants the full panoply of protections that
a trial would (in practice and not just in theory), Rule 609 will remain
one of the most fundamentally unfair and repugnant rules applicable
in criminal cases.
551. See supra Part III.A.3.
552. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 361, at iv (describing the lack of effective R
legal representation).
553. See supra Part III.
554. See supra Part II.B.
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B. Proposal for Judicial Action: Expanding the Loper Doctrine
Until Congress acts, courts should recognize and address the fun-
damental unfairness associated with using untried convictions to im-
peach criminal defendants.  The unreliability of plea bargains as
evidence under Rule 609 raises serious due process concerns, and
courts have a duty to address and alleviate those concerns.  I realize
that some judges, particularly those who have themselves become ad-
vocates in the plea bargaining system, might scoff at the notion that
untried convictions are unreliable sources of Rule 609 evidence.555
While I would hope to persuade those judges otherwise, realistically,
the judges I am most likely to reach are those who are already con-
cerned about the injustices inflicted by the discussed plea bargaining
machine as well as about the impact of Rule 609 on a macro level.556
There is precedent, as I will discuss below, upon which such judges
can rely and build in addressing these issues.
As discussed earlier in this Article, in the plea bargaining setting,
prosecutors often use Rule 609 as leverage in coercing pleas from
criminal defendants.557  In the trial setting, prior convictions under
Rule 609 are routinely admitted against criminal defendants.558
When the government introduces a prior conviction against a defen-
dant for impeachment purposes, in practice the defendant has little
ability under existing law to launch a challenge to the substantive va-
lidity of the prior conviction and the fundamental fairness of its use.
Indeed, a leading evidence treatise explains that “many cases forbid
any explanation, extenuation or denial of guilt even by the witness
himself on redirect.”559  This prohibition is “a logical consequence of
the premise of conclusiveness of the judgment.”560  The treatise, how-
ever, also notes the following:
[A] substantial number of courts, while not opening the
door to a retrial of the conviction, do permit the witness him-
self to make a brief and general statement in explanation, miti-
gation, or denial of guilt, or recognize a discretion in the
555. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19; see also supra Part III.A.1. R
556. See, e.g., Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Judges, Racism, and the Problem of Actual Innocence,
57 ME. L. REV. 481, 505–10 (2005) (discussing Judge Stephen Fortunato’s argument for
the elimination of Rule 609 and noting that “[w]hile the admission of a prior record hurts
a defendant, whatever his color, blacks wishing to testify in their own defense in a criminal
trial are more disadvantaged as a group than whites”).
557. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
558. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. R
559. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
560. Id.
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trial judge to permit it.  Wigmore aptly terms it a “harmless
charity . . .”561
Thus, no serious consideration is given to the conviction’s reliability.
The Supreme Court, however, has carved out one constitutionally
compelled exception that rests on due process principles of funda-
mental fairness, but the exception is narrow.  The Supreme Court in
Loper v. Beto562 held that convictions that are void because they re-
sulted from criminal proceedings in which the defendant was denied
the right to counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright563 are per se unrelia-
ble and inadmissible under Rule 609.564  The Court found that the
use of such convictions would violate the fundamental fairness re-
quirement of the Due Process Clause.565 Loper’s holding applies only
to convictions obtained in cases where the right to counsel was denied
altogether and the conviction was later determined to be void.566
Loper remains instructive, however, because the core principle in
the case was that prior convictions must be reliable to be admissible
under Rule 609.567  There are some who will likely not want to apply
Loper more broadly in cases in which the source of unreliability was
not the outright denial of counsel, but “the rationale of Loper could be
extended beyond cases in which the right to counsel was denied.”568
Loper’s reliance on due process as the basis for holding that convic-
tions obtained absent the right to counsel were unconstitutional “per-
mits the argument that procedures violating other rights essential to
reliability could also produce unreliable tainted convictions.”569
561. Id. (emphasis added).
562. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
563. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
564. Loper, 405 U.S. at 483 (“‘The absence of counsel impairs the reliability of such
convictions just as much when used to impeach as when used as direct proof of guilt.’”
(quoting Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1970))).
565. Id.
566. See, e.g., Smith v. Collins, 964 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[The defendant’s]
reliance on Loper is misplaced. Loper involved convictions used for impeachment which
were constitutionally invalid because the accused was denied the right to counsel—a defect
which impairs the very integrity and reliability of a conviction.  [The defendant’s] prior
convictions were invalidated because the indictments contained technical defects.  The factual
reliability of his convictions were [sic] not questioned.” (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted)); State v. Dahlin, 971 P.2d 763, 765 (Mont. 1998) (“Here, no prior conviction later
determined invalid was introduced into evidence. . . .  In contrast to the prior convictions
at issue in . . . Loper, [the defendant’s] testimony has not been ruled invalid or void . . . .”).
567. 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 6140 (1993).
568. Id. (italics added).
569. Id. (emphasis added).
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Interestingly, if the conviction were from another country, comity
principles, which are far less rigid, would apply.  Comity focuses on
the “fundamental fairness” of the prior proceedings.570  Comity pro-
ceeds from the notion that there is no obligation to recognize judg-
ments rendered in foreign jurisdictions, including judgments of
convictions.571  The recognition of those judgments stems from an act
of courtesy, respect, or goodwill.
Fundamental fairness is the basic measure by which we evaluate
foreign country judgments, including foreign convictions.572  While
we do not require a foreign judgment to have been rendered under a
system that provides for trial by jury,573 our courts do look for basic
procedural protections.574  For Rule 609 purposes, we should examine
untried convictions from U.S. domestic courts with at least the same
minimal level of scrutiny.  We should treat criminal defendants who
have been convicted in our own system at least as well as those who
have been convicted in foreign systems.
A foreign country conviction is admissible against a defendant for
impeachment purposes “provided the accused has not shown evi-
dence of a lack of fairness in the foreign justice system.”575  In United
States v. Wilson,576 the Fourth Circuit applied a fundamental fairness
test to a German criminal proceeding that resulted in a rape convic-
tion.577  The defendant was impeached with the German conviction
during his rape trial in federal court.578  The Fourth Circuit addressed
the admissibility of the conviction under Rule 609 by analyzing the
fundamental fairness of the proceedings.579  Noting that the funda-
mental fairness inquiry does not require trial by jury, the court ob-
served as follows:
The only question here is whether the German legal system
is so fundamentally unfair that a conviction obtained under
it is inadmissible.  The defendant has not shown that the
570. United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir. 1977).
571. See Montre´ D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1159, 1165–67 (2007) (explaining that comity proceeds from the fact that
there is no full faith and credit due to foreign judgments).
572. See, e.g., Wilson, 556 F.2d at 1178 (“The only question here is whether the German
legal system is so fundamentally unfair that a conviction obtained under it is
inadmissible.”).
573. Id.
574. See infra text accompanying note 584. R
575. Riechmann v. State, 581 So. 2d 133, 139 (Fla. 1991).
576. 556 F.2d 1177.
577. Id. at 1178.
578. Id.
579. Id.
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German legal system lacks the procedural protections neces-
sary for fundamental fairness.  We note that . . . the defen-
dant does not claim that he lacked the assistance of counsel
during his trial in Germany.580
Our courts generally respect foreign legal authority, but there
have been a few instances in which American courts have refused to
recognize a foreign court’s judgment because of concerns about the
lack of fundamental fairness.  In United States v. Moskovits,581 in the
context of addressing a sentencing enhancement issue, a federal dis-
trict court refused to allow the prosecution to use a Mexican convic-
tion against a criminal defendant.582  The court found that the
proceedings were lacking in basic fairness because the defendant was
denied counsel at “crucial stages” of the criminal process.583  The Mos-
kovits court explained that courts “should test a foreign conviction by
its conformity with those particular norms of American criminal pro-
cedures, jurisprudence constitutionalized, that are the particular do-
main of absolute rock bottom fundamental fairness.”584  And according to
the court, “[t]he participation of counsel at crucial stages of the crimi-
nal proceeding is one such fundamental norm.”585
In the civil context, our courts have refused to recognize certain
Iranian judgments after finding that they lacked fundamental fairness
because the judiciaries at the time the judgments were rendered
lacked independence, were highly politicized, and did not hold public
trials, and the parties had “little reasonable expectation of justice.”586
Similarly, our courts have refused to recognize particular Liberian
judgments because their entire system was plagued by corruption and
the “incompetent handling of cases remained a recurrent prob-
lem.”587  While I take issue with courts, as an institutional competence
matter, passing judgments on a country’s entire judicial system, these
cases are instructive for purposes of evaluating Rule 609 evidence to
the extent that the fundamental fairness inquiry can be applied to the
particulars of the circumstances giving rise to a defendant’s untried
conviction.  As in the case of a foreign judicial system, the political
580. Id.
581. 784 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
582. Id. at 192.
583. Id. at 190.
584. Id. (emphasis added).
585. Id.
586. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1411–12 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
587. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
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branches of government are much better suited to critique the funda-
mental fairness of the entire plea bargaining system, which is why my
first proposal is for lawmakers to act.588
It is important to note that these foreign conviction cases typically
involve claims that the defendants were denied the right to counsel,
but the courts in those cases have never limited the scope of their
fundamental fairness inquiry to the right to counsel, in contrast with
the Loper doctrine.  As the Moskovits court noted, the assistance of
counsel is one of those fundamental norms that ensure fundamental
fairness.589  The foreign civil judgment cases indicate that a system is
fundamentally unfair if the judiciary lacks independence and is highly
politicized, if trials rarely are held publicly, and if parties have “little
reasonable expectation of justice.”590  These indicators of fundamen-
tal fairness sound remarkably similar to the realities of the plea bar-
gaining system.  It would be interesting to see how a court would
evaluate an untried conviction obtained in another country under
some of the same troubling circumstances outlined earlier in this
Article.
Judges who are concerned about fundamental fairness when
faced with the question of whether to admit a prior conviction for
impeachment purposes should expand Loper’s doctrine and formulate
an analysis akin to that which courts use in the foreign judgment
cases.  Courts should not routinely admit untried convictions under
Rule 609.  Instead, they should seriously consider a defendant’s claims
regarding the lack of fundamental fairness in the plea bargaining pro-
cess.  If a defendant makes a colorable claim that the plea bargaining
process that resulted in his conviction was fundamentally unfair, the
burden should shift to the prosecutor to establish the fundamental
fairness of those proceedings.
Sharp prosecutors might attempt to get around this proposed sys-
tem by requiring, as part of the plea bargain, that defendants waive
their ability to challenge the Rule 609 use of their untried convictions
in later and unrelated proceedings.591  But courts should refuse to al-
low prosecutors to avoid scrutiny of untried convictions offered for
impeachment purposes by invoking any such waivers, which would
smack of unconscionability.  Moreover, the defendant would certainly
588. See supra Part IV.A.
589. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. at 190.
590. Bank Melli Iran, 58 F.3d at 1411–12 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
591. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of waivers under Federal Rule of Evidence
410.
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not be making a knowing and voluntary waiver592 because he would
have no idea about the exact context or contexts in which the untried
conviction could be used against him to convict him of other crimes.
For example, the later charges could be for simple assault, or they
could be much more serious, such as first degree murder.  And the
strength of the prosecutor’s case could vary greatly, which the defen-
dant would have no way of knowing prior to being charged.
My proposal requires that judges determine reliability prior to ad-
missibility of untried conviction impeachment evidence.  I do not
think that this is a matter that should be left for juries to determine
because of the potential that they will prejudice defendants even more
for having pled guilty previously.593  There is a very negative public
perception—indeed, a “widespread unpopularity”—of plea bargain-
ing.594  Thus, courts should be particularly careful when considering
the possible prejudice that might result should prosecutors wish to
reveal to the jury that a conviction was from a plea bargaining process.
There should be a preference, under due process fundamental
fairness standards, for trial convictions under Rule 609.  As Judge Bur-
ger suggested years ago, there is something very different about plea
bargaining, and courts should recognize this.595  To protect the rights
of the defendant, judges should make a determination as to the relia-
bility of untried convictions as a preliminary matter under Rule
104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,596 which applies the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard.  At all times, the ultimate burden
should be on the prosecution to establish the fundamental fairness of
the proceedings that resulted in the conviction sought to be used
under Rule 609.597  Even if a court finds that the untried conviction is
reliable, it should still consider whether the probative value, under the
592. See Hall, supra note 121, at 601–02 (requiring Rule 410 waivers to be made know- R
ingly and voluntarily).
593. See supra text accompanying notes 159–63 for a discussion of how jurors improp- R
erly use knowledge of a defendant’s prior conviction.
594. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
912 n.171 (2004) (referring to the “widespread unpopularity” of plea bargaining); see also
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 979 (1985)
(describing arguments made by critics of plea bargaining).
595. See supra notes 200–05 and accompanying text. R
596. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
597. See, e.g., People v. Gaines, 341 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
the prosecution has the burden of proving fairness of a foreign criminal system if the
defendant objects to impeachment with the foreign conviction on the basis of unfairness of
foreign system).
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circumstances, should be discounted in its required Rule 403-style bal-
ancing test that is actually a part of Rule 609.598
What I propose is similar to what some courts do in the civil con-
text with respect to applicability of issue preclusion or collateral estop-
pel to convictions resulting from plea bargains, which I discussed
earlier in this Article.599  For example, in Talarico v. Dunlap,600 the
Illinois Supreme Court said that it would “look behind the curtain
of . . . negotiated plea[s]” to determine “on a case-by-case basis”
whether the criminal defendant had an “incentive to litigate” his crim-
inal case, which is necessary for the application of issue preclusion.601
Thus, the court considered the terms of the defendant’s plea deal and
the record of the proceedings in his criminal case to determine if
there was a “compelling showing of unfairness.”602
I envision an analogous inquiry with untried convictions offered
for impeachment.  With respect to the issue of assistance of counsel,
for example, courts should be concerned with more than whether
there was an attorney representing the defendant on the record as a
mere formality.  Defendants should be able to raise claims that their
attorneys pressured them into pleading or were otherwise ineffective
during the bargaining process.603  Furthermore, judges should con-
sider the fundamental fairness of some indigent defense rules that do
not adequately provide for persons who are poor and cannot afford
counsel, but who are not poor enough under the relevant statutes.604
Of course, access to effective counsel, as the foreign conviction
cases aptly illustrate, is one of the fundamental norms necessary for
basic fairness.605  Former Attorney General Janet Reno once ex-
plained that her “experiences as a prosecutor and as Attorney General
ha[d] taught [her] just how important it is for every leg of the criminal
justice system to stand strong.”606  This, according to Reno, includes
indigent defense:
598. FED. R. EVID. 609 (stating that the “probative value” must “outweigh[ the convic-
tion’s] prejudicial effect to the accused”); see supra note 134 and accompanying text. R
599. See supra notes 207–15 and accompanying text. R
600. 685 N.E.2d 325 (Ill. 1997).
601. Id. at 331–32.
602. Id. at 330.
603. See supra Part III.A.2.c.
604. See supra Part III.A.2.c.
605. United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 183, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (explaining that
“participation of counsel at crucial stages of the criminal proceeding” is one of the “funda-
mental norm[s]” of fairness).
606. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH EX-
PANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
ON INDIGENT DEFENSE xiii (1999) (emphasis added).
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Indigent defense is an equally essential element of the crimi-
nal justice process, one which should be appropriately struc-
tured and funded and operating with effective standards. . . .
When the conviction of a defendant is challenged on the ba-
sis of inadequate representation, the very legitimacy of the
conviction itself is called into question.  Our criminal justice
system is interdependent: if one leg of the system is weaker
than others, the whole system will ultimately falter.607
A consistent theme in the aforementioned ABA Committee re-
port is that “indigent defense in the United States remains in a state of
crisis, resulting in a system that lacks fundamental fairness and places
poor persons at constant risk of wrongful conviction.”608  The Su-
preme Court has observed the following:
[M]ere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself as-
sure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and . . . a
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds
against an indigent defendant without making certain that
he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of
an effective defense.609
Judges should judge each other and refuse to admit prior convic-
tions obtained as the result of coercive practices by the court.610  The
courts likewise should consider prosecutors’ behavior in the bargain-
ing process to determine if they used unduly coercive practices that
resulted in fundamental unfairness.611  Judges should have broad dis-
cretion to consider all of the realities of the plea bargaining system
that I discussed above.
I would expect the usual fallback, the judicial economy argu-
ment, to be made by critics of my proposal.  But as one scholar aptly
stated, “The primary objective of our criminal justice system must be
fairness and justice, not finality and judicial economy”612 (or what re-
ally is a false sense of judicial economy).  Additionally, I would expect
related arguments that allowing defendants to “impeach” the plea bar-
gaining process will result in a “mini-trial” on a “collateral issue.”  I
would point out that Rule 609 is effectively much more than a collat-
eral issue, which is why scholars have been so critical of prior convic-
tion impeachment.  Jurors can and will use prior convictions as
607. Id.
608. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 361, at v. R
609. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
610. See supra Part III.A.2.d.
611. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
612. Klein, supra note 406, at 1368. R
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substantive evidence of guilt.613  So, it is a serious mistake to minimize
the importance of this evidence.  Judges need to take the time to en-
sure that prior convictions are reliable if they are going to admit them
against criminal defendants.
Furthermore, there may be some who are concerned that my pro-
posal will result in fewer plea bargains, which might potentially over-
burden the system even more.  To the contrary, my proposal will
improve the overall accuracy of the system, which is a more cost effec-
tive strategy in the long run than perpetuating assembly-line justice.
As one commentator recently noted in critiquing his state’s indigent
defense system, “Each person wrongfully incarcerated costs Michigan
taxpayers $35,000 a year.”614  Convicting the innocent also results in
psychological scars—not only for the victim, but for society as a whole.
Furthermore, an accurate system is more effective for dealing with
crime, which costs us all as a society financially and emotionally.615
So, in a sense, an inaccurate system causes our society at least a double
burden, if not more.  As the Michigan commentary aptly reminds us,
“when innocent people are convicted, the guilty remain at large.”616
Any concern about further burdening the system must be addressed
through properly funding the system, as a handful of jurisdictions are
attempting to do.617
Finally, some might argue that it is unreasonable or even unfair
to place the burden on prosecutors to prove the reliability of untried
convictions, and that they may not have access to information neces-
sary to refute claims of undue coercion, as when the conviction is
from another jurisdiction.  My response is that if the court finds that
the defendant can make a colorable claim of fundamental unfairness,
the prosecution should have to justify the admission of this highly
prejudicial evidence.  The prosecution always has the option of simply
not using the evidence, as it certainly has no fundamental right to
have prior convictions admitted against a criminal defendant.  If its
case against the defendant is strong, the prosecution should have no
reason to worry.
613. See supra text accompanying notes 159–63.
614. Editorial, No Justice on the Cheap; Guaranteeing Citizens’ Constitutional Rights Is a Basic
Function of State Government—And Adequately Funding Indigent Defense Will Save Michigan
Money in the Long Run, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 8, 2009, at 1.
615. Id.
616. Id.
617. See id. (citing Louisiana, for example, as a state that has “quadrupled” its funding
for indigent defense).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has taken a New Legal Realist approach to an explo-
ration of two of the most controversial practices in the criminal justice
system—plea bargaining as well as the use of prior convictions for the
purposes of impeaching criminal defendants at trial.  By exposing the
interdependence on these practices, both of which are deeply flawed,
I have demonstrated that working together, they both undermine the
reliability of the criminal process.  My focus in this Article on the plea
bargaining process as the source of unreliable impeachment evidence
provides a much needed consideration of the real manner in which
Rule 609 currently operates on the ground within our system of
justice.
Moreover, my proposed solutions offer real world approaches for
working within the system to improve its reliability.  To the extent that
Congress does not act, judges who are genuinely interested in re-
forming the system can restructure the relationship between plea bar-
gaining and prior conviction impeachment by utilizing Rule 609 as an
independent quality control mechanism as opposed to the
codependent device that promotes and legitimizes our broken plea
bargaining process.
Criminal defendants have a right to fundamental fairness—even
if this right was previously denied and resulted in an unreliable con-
viction.  We should not allow past injustices in the system to justify
future injustices.  Disentangling the dysfunctional relationship be-
tween plea bargaining and the prior conviction impeachment practice
will permit the rules of evidence to further the goals of accuracy and
truth-seeking—thus promoting fairness in the criminal system and
helping to re-establish its legitimacy.
